Objective. The literature on indiscriminate violence has emphasized how information shapes state capacity and determines whether and where the government employs collective targeting. This article investigates the conditions that influence the government's ability to obtain intelligence in counterinsurgencies. Specifically, it suggests that the government is more likely to use indiscriminate violence in areas characterized by indigenous ethnic homogeneity and forested terrain. These features increase the cost of acquiring information about the insurgents, and reduce state capacity, thereby increasing the likelihood of indiscriminate violence. Method. We examine district-level data on the Russian government's use of indiscriminate violence and disaggregated data on ethnicity and terrain across the North Caucasus from 2000 to 2011. Results. The results indicate that ethnically homogeneous and forested areas are significantly more likely targets of indiscriminate violence, and that the effect of ethnicity is markedly stronger when the district is densely forested. Conclusion. This finding expands on previous studies by testing the observable implications of theories linking information to indiscriminate violence, and by providing new micro-level evidence for important human and physical constraints on counterinsurgencies.

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What explains the variation in individual support for the territorial integrity of the state that faces violent secession? While previous research has emphasised the role of state elites, institutions, and secessionist groups, this article elucidates the popular underpinnings of the state's response to secessionist claims. The proposed theory utilises in‐group and between‐group social distance to explain individual attitudes. Greater alienation from society leads people in the core state to reduce their support for the territorial integrity of the state. The perception of the cultural distinction of the secessionist group is associated with higher or lower support for the territorial integrity of the state, depending on the feasibility of reconquest of the secessionist territory. When reconquest is probable, support for the territorial integrity of the state will be positively associated with cultural distance. When it is improbable, support for the territorial integrity of the state will be negatively associated with cultural distance. The analysis of survey data from the South Caucasian countries that have struggled with secessionist movements for decades provides strong supportive evidence for these conjectures.

Why do some secessionist claims turn violent and others stay peaceful? This study elucidates the role of inequality and diversionary tactics of states in secessionist violence. Horizontal inequality increases the grievances of minorities and fuels rebellion. States with high vertical inequality prefer to suppress peripheries instead of increasing redistribution and alleviating their material grievances. States shun redistributing toward peripheral regions because sharing with one group prompts demands for redistribution among other groups, including the dominant group. Fearing resource reallocation at the national scale and potential loss of their elevated social status, the elites opt for violent solutions for secessionist crises. Using a new dataset on self-determination movements I test these conjectures and find strong support for them.