Come “regola”, la tortura di schiavi innocenti che è stata concordata dai querelantia fini probatori (βάσανος probatori) fu ritenuto dagli oratori lo strumento più efficace per giungere alla verità. Questo paper, con riferimento alla psicologia dell”antica Grecia, spiega perché la menzionata regola fu di cruciale importanza per la retorica. Gli oratori, sulla base della presunta attendibilità dell”istituzione dei βάσανος, furono in grado di sviluppare argomenti basati sulle sfide (πρόκλησις), che possono essere comprese al meglio alla luce della concezione greca, piuttosto che moderna, di razionalità ed azione umana. Di conseguenza, a dispetto dell”incertezza che circonda l”attualità della tortura a fini probatori nell”età degli oratori, l”importanza retorica dei πρόκλησις εἰς βάσανον è innegabile e va esaminata attentamente.

Come 'regola', la tortura di schiavi innocenti che è stata concordata dai querelantia fini probatori (βάσανος probatori) fu ritenuto dagli oratori lo strumento più efficace per giungere alla verità. Questo paper, con riferimento alla psicologia dell'antica Grecia, spiega perché la menzionata regola fu di cruciale importanza per la retorica. Gli oratori, sulla base della presunta attendibilità dell'istituzione dei βάσανος, furono in grado di sviluppare argomenti basati sulle sfide (πρόκλησις), che possono essere comprese al meglio alla luce della concezione greca, piuttosto che moderna, di razionalità ed azione umana. Di conseguenza, a dispetto dell'incertezza che circonda l'attualità della tortura a fini probatori nell'età degli oratori, l'importanza retorica dei πρόκλησις εἰς βάσανον è innegabile e va esaminata attentamente.

By reference to legal positivism and Hart’s Concept of Law, the paper argues that populism targets and aims to reconstruct the democratic rule of recognition. In particular, populism exploits the ambiguities in the nature of this social rule, by advocating the extension of the group whose consensus determines the criteria of legal validity from the restricted sphere of judges and officials, to the people at large. Populism instrumentalises the functions of the rule of recognition, aiming to provoke uncertainty in the system in order to accomplish a shift and, thus, alter the content of the rule. Infiltrating concepts with meanings that suit its ends and reordering the criteria of legal validity, populism prioritises an absolute form of popular sovereignty over a thin, dubious version of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the latter’s ambiguity allows populism to claim that the rule of law still forms part of its rule of recognition.

This doctoral thesis aims to explore the underlying rationale of the (by modern standards) wide use of character evidence in the courts of classical Athens.Linking divergent areas of social sciences such as law, history, psychology and social anthropology, this interdisciplinary quest examines under a socio-political prism the question of legal relevance in Athenian forensic rhetoric. Specifically, I am concerned with an in-depth analysis of the surviving court speeches placed in their context in order to reveal the function of the Athenian courts and the fundamental nature of Athenian law.I explore the utmost aims of the first democratic system of justice and give a verdict as to its orientation towards the attainment of key notions such as the rule of law, equity and fairness, or social stability through utilitarian dispute resolution. My claim is that, although ancient and modern definitions of such ideals are in essence incomparable, the Athenians achieved the rule of law in their own terms through the strict application of legal justice in their courts. In such a legal system, no 'aberrations' or irrelevant 'extra-legal' arguments may carry significant weight.Central for my argument is the homogeneous approach to (legal and quasilegal) argumentation from Homer to the orators, in a period covering more than four centuries. Close analysis of the dispute-resolution passages in ancientGreek literature exposes the striking similarities with the rhetoric of litigants in the Athenian courts. Therefore, instead of isolating (in time and space) the sphere of the Athenian courts of the mid-5 th to the late-4 th centuries, my holistic approach discloses the need for an all-embracing interpretation of the wide use of character evidence in every aspect of argumentation. I argue that the explanation for this practice is to be found (on a subjective level) in the Greek ideas of 'character' and 'personality', the inductive method of reasoning, and (on an objective level) in the social, political and institutional structures of the ancient Greek polis. Thus, a new exegesis to the question of legal relevance for the Greeks emerges.τὸ γὰρ μετὰ πολλῶν παραδειγμάτων διδάσκειν ῥᾳδίαν ὑμῖν τὴν κρίσιν καθίστησι (Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 124) [3] LIST OF CONTENTS

What was the function of classical Athenian courts? Did they intend to enforce the rule of law? The greatest obstacle to accepting an affirmative answer is the wide use of, at first sight and from a modern (sometimes anachronistic) perspective, remotely relevant argumentation by litigants. In this paper, by reference to Greek ideas of personality, I analyse and demonstrate the legal relevance of extra-legal argumentation in classical Athenian courts, using as a case study the widely criticised invocation of liturgies (public services) by litigants. In particular, by applying a model of human action and ethical motivation which is more appropriate to the Greeks (rather that the unsuitable for the ancient context Cartesian/ Kantian), a better understanding of forensic rhetoric and argumentation is achieved. Therefore, in accordance with Greek psychology, the admittedly liberal approach to legal relevance of the Athenian courts was a calculated step towards the attainment of legal justice and the rule of law as the Athenians perceived it.