The aim of this review was to analyse the empirical studies that focus on ethics in nursing care for older people, scoping the need and areas for further study. A search of the MEDLINE and CINAHL databases (earliest to August 2009) was conducted using the the keywords: ethic* and nursing or care or caring and elderly or aged or older. After a four-stage process, 71 empirical articles were included in the review, with informants ranging from elderly people to relatives, caregivers, managers and students in care settings. The review focuses on the concepts, contexts, methods and validity of these studies. Based on the analysis, the reviewed research seems to be fragmented and multifaceted, focussing on selected issues such as autonomy, self-determination and informed consent. No large research programs or research traditions were found so it was not possible to draw any conclusions about suitable methods, study designs or instruments of measurement for use in this research area.

Privacy is a key ethical principle in occupational health services. Its importance is emphasised in several laws, in ethical codes of conduct as well as in the literature, yet there is only very limited empirical research on privacy in the occupational health context. Conceptual questions on privacy in the occupational health context are discussed. The baseline assumption is that, in this context, privacy cannot be approached and examined only from the employee’s (an individual) vantage point but the employer’s (a group) point of view must also be taken into account, and that the concept has several dimensions (physical, social, informational and psychological). Even though privacy is a basic human need, there is no universally accepted definition of the concept and no consensus on whether an organisation can have privacy in the same way as people do. Many of the challenges surrounding privacy in the context of occupational health seem to be associated with the dual loyalties of occupational health professionals towards the employee and employer and with their simultaneous duties of disseminating and protecting information (informational privacy). Privacy is thus not an absolute value, but more research is needed to understand its multidimensional nature in the context of occupational health.

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European citizens are quite happy to use genetically modified medicine, while they are rather critical towards genetically modified food. In this paper, we analyse philosophical and conceptual reasons for and against this asymmetry in the attitudes of Europeans. Moreover, we consider the justifiability of this difference in attitudes. We conclude that all GM-foods and all GM-medicines do not differ dramatically with respect to their intended purposes and outcomes-at least the ones associated with the saving of human lives. However, people worry far more about the possible undesirable health related, environmental, and social side-effects of GM-food than those of GM-medicine. This may be explained partly by differences in experienced trust in actors and authorities within these two industries, and partly by differences in production procedures. The asymmetry in people's views can also be explained by the different roles food and medicine play in our daily lives. Food is usually associated with values that contradict genetic modification, whereas in the case of medicine values compatible with genetic modification usually prevail. Moreover, food is more intimately related to our social life and personal life choices than medicine. Some life styles adopted by people restrict the use of GM-food, whereas life style restrictions on GM-medicine are considerably rarer. Thus, the asymmetry in people's attitudes concerning GM-food and GM-medicine may well be justified and rational-at least from the point of view of the deeper values and beliefs people hold.

In the bioethical literature, discrimination in insurance on the basis of genetic risk factors detected by genetic testing has been defended and opposed on various ethical grounds. One important argument in favour of the practice is offered by those who believe that it is not possible to distinguish between genetic and non-genetic information, at least not for practical policy purposes such as insurance decision-making. According to the argument from indistinguishability, the use of genetic test information for insurance purposes should be permitted, because genetic test information is no different from non-genetic medical information in any relevant respect, therefore it would be inconsistent to prohibit the former whilst permitting the latter. This paper discusses and defends this argument and suggests a new, more tenable foundation.