In this paper, I investigate the issue of the contingency and inevitability of science. First, I point out valuable insights from the existing discussion about the issue. I then formulate a general framework, built on the notion of contrastive explanation and counterfactuals, that can be used to approach questions of contingency of science. I argue, with an example from the existing historiography of science, that this framework could be useful to historians of science. Finally, I argue that this framework shows the existing views on historical contingency and counterfactuals in a new light. The framework also shows the value of existing historiography in philosophical debates.

In this paper, I explicate desiderata for accounts of explanation in historiography. I argue that a fully developed account of explanation in historiography must explicate many explanation-related notions in order to be satisfactory. In particular, it is not enough that an account defines the basic structure of explanation. In addition, the account of explanation must be able to explicate notions such as minimal explanation, complete explanation, historiographical explanation, explanatory depth, explanatory competition, and explanatory goal. Moreover, the account should also tell how explananda can be chosen in a motivated way. Furthermore, the account should be able to clarify notions that are closely connected with explanation such as historical contingency. Finally, it is important that the account is able to recognize when explanation-related notions and issues are so closely intertwined that we are in danger of not seeing the differences between them. In other words, I argue that a satisfactory account of explanation in historiography must have the power to explicate central explanation-related notions and to clarify discussions where the differences between the notions are obscure. In order to explicate these desiderata, I formulate a (version of the) counterfactual account of explanation and show how that account is able to explicate explanation-related notions and clarify issues that are connected with historiographical explanations. The success of the counterfactual account suggests that historiographical explanations do not differ fundamentally from explanations in many other fields.

Evanston: Northwestern University Press (2020), 208 pp.Roth's book is rich and intense. In a relatively short space, it seeks to locate historical explanations within our general metaphysical and epistemic predicaments. Understanding the argumentative nuances of the book requires knowledge of analytic philosophy of history, analytic philosophy in general, philosophy and history of science, and narrative theory. As Roth's book provides an excellent overview of the potential richness and importance of philosophy of history, critically engaging with its contents and strategy enables us to see possible ways to cross-fertilize current philosophy of history and trends in other areas of philosophical research. In this review, I focus on those issues that might interest philosophers of science the most.Roth's book centers on the notion of essentially narrative explanation. "[A] narrative involves an "unfolding," sequencing of a series of events that accounts for a development" (66). Narrative explanations explain narrative sentences (see below). "A narrative explanation will be a presentation of a temporal series that answers why the explanandum turns out to be as it is. [--] [It provides] a sequencing of events that has the later event emerge as a consequence of the earlier" ( 6).] Narrative explanations necessarily require a retrospective stance: We can identify a historical event and thus its beginning only retrospectively. A narrative also "simultaneously constitutes and constructs both explanans and explanandum" (71). The sequencing of events that a narrative explanation provides also constitutes the event in question.Essentially narrative explanations have three characteristic features: nonstandardization, nonaggregativity, and nondetachability (SAD).

In this paper, I argue that analyzing pursuitworthiness in science requires that we study possible futures of science. The merits of different criteria of pursuitworthiness need to be assessed against scenarios of the future of science. Different criteria recognize and ignore different scenarios. As a consequence, different criteria enable us to manage different future possibilities. While it might be impossible to predict the future of science, there are still many interesting things we can say about the possible futures of science. We can construct scenarios of the future of science on the basis of philosophical accounts of science. I point out that the topic of pursuitworthiness is not the only topic that can be approached by connecting philosophy of science with the construction of scenarios.

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