Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage-setting mechanism -either by bargaining or through the posting of a non-negotiable wage offer in a job ad -to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers' search. JEL classification: J23, M51L'annonce du salaire : résultatsà partir des annonces d'emplois. Desétudes récentes de la théorie de la recherche d'employés examinent comment les employeurs utilisent le mécanisme de détermination des salaires -soit par marchandage, soit en mentionnant une offre de salaire non-négociable dans l'annonce de l'offre d'emploi -pour faciliter le processus de recherche. On examine les salaires mentionnés dans les annonces d'offre d'emplois auxÉtats-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, et en Slovénie. Malgré des différences considérables dans l'incidence de l'annonce du salaire, les employeurs dans ces trois marchés sont moins susceptibles d'annoncer un salaire quand ils cherchent des travailleurs qualifiés. La décision d'annoncer un salaire ou non est seulement faiblement reliée aux résultats de la recherche des employeurs.The author wishes to thank two referees for many helpful comments which have significantly improved the paper.

An analysis of US and Slovenian vacancy data sets reveals that an employer who is searching to fill a job vacancy is more likely to fill the vacancy by hiring an under-qualified worker when the search costs are higher; when, at the start of the search, the employer has less time to search at low cost; and during the week following an increase in search costs. These are interesting findings not only about the effects of search costs on employers' hiring decisions, but also because they suggest that search frictions in the two labour markets may be considerable. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2009.

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Drawing on job postings at an online job board, we find that employers who have to fill their vacancies immediately specify fewer job requirements, provide more details about the job application process, and are quicker to withdraw their vacancies from the job board than employers with job openings that do not have to be filled immediately. These findings offer new insights into the role of vacancy costs in determining how employers search for workers online.

We find that not all employers use on-line search tools when they post their vacancies on on-line job boards, even though the tools that are offered by the job boards are free and purportedly facilitate search. Drawing on descriptions of vacancies collected from the on-line job board Monster.com, we find that the on-line recruitment and screening tools that are offered by Monster.com are more likely to be used when employers actively engage in search or use the job board frequently. Consistent with a standard search model, both vacancy and employer attributes explain the duration of a vacancy's posting on Monster.com. (JEL J2, M1)