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Edouard Machery's article "What is Replication?" deserves particular critical attention. For if it is correct, his Resampling Account of Replication has the power to reshape the current debate on replication in psychology. Indeed, with his new proposal, philosopher Machery claims to replace the "vague characterization of replication in psychology" (Machery, 2020, p. 559) with an account that deflates one of the central debates on replication-the debate which contraposes direct and conceptual replications and asks which one is preferable. In this commentary, I argue that there are deep-rooted reasons for why the distinction is meaningful, and that the Resampling Account of Replication just offers a misleading "semantic shift." Public Significance StatementThis commentary argues against the resampling account of replication proposed in Machery (2020) and reflects on the significance of the distinction between direct and conceptual replication, which is common lore in psychology. The discussion offered in this contribution may lead to advances in the understanding of the functions and value of replication in psychology.

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