Das Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip kommt in den unterschiedlichsten Bereichen des Unionsrechts zur Anwendung und kann als eines der tragenden Querschnittsprinzipien der Unionsrechtsordnung in ihrem derzeitigen Entwicklungsstand bezeichnet werden. 1 Es vermag daher auch nicht zu verwundern, dass sich der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden: Gerichtshof oder EuGH) in einer mittlerweile nahezu unüberschaubaren Zahl von Urteilen und Beschlüssen mit der Anwendung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips auseinandergesetzt hat. 2 Dabei handelt es sich vorwiegend um Verfahren, in denen die Rechtsmäßigkeit von Unionsmaßnahmen und von mitgliedstaatlichen Maßnahmen oder Handlungen in Rede steht, sowie um Verfahren, in denen über die konkrete inhaltliche Ausgestaltung und Abgrenzung unionsrechtlich definierter Rechtspositionen zu befinden ist. Die Vielzahl der Entscheidungen, in denen der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz thematisiert wird, lässt sich dadurch erklären, dass diesem Grundsatz verschiedene Funktionen in der Unionsrechtsordnung zukommen. Sie verdeutlicht zudem, dass es vermessen wäre, eine abschließende Aufzählung aller Anwendungsmodalitäten des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes in der Unionsrechtsordnung geben zu wollen. Letzteres ist deshalb auch nicht das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Vielmehr wird im Nachfolgenden auf zwei der wichtigsten Funktionen des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes eingegangen, nämlich seine Rolle als Kompetenzausübungsschranke im Sinne von Art. 5 EUV einerseits sowie seine Anwendung im Kontext der Überprüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit von Beschränkungen von Grundfreiheiten und von Grundrechten andererseits. I.

Collective redress is a procedural mechanism that allows for reasons of procedural economy and efficiency of enforcement many similar legal claims to be combined into a single court action. Consumers and investors encounter problems with the enforcement of their rights through the individual redress, especially in times of the financial crisis. If a substantial number of harmed individuals decide not to pursue their, usually low, claims, the unduly gained profits of the opposite party can be extremely high. Thus, collective redress mechanisms can represent better option for consumers and investors, as their claims tend to be much less burdensome in case of the collective action. However, such mechanisms can trigger the abuse of the procedures, with the most commonly quoted threat being the example of American regulation of class actions. Negative characteristics of American model are the reasons that EU decided to shape its own concept of collective redress mechanisms. The binding act in this field in the EU is directive on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests; however, there is no binding act yet regarding compensatory actions. In June 2013, the European Commission published the Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law. It is not binding on Member States, however, it can serve as a guideline to improve their existing legislations, especially the regulation of collective compensatory actions. In so doing, consumers and investors might be given the possibility to use more efficient mechanism to compensate the harm suffered.

The principle of primacy of the EU law has been in force for almost 50 years and belongs to the fundamental principles of EU law. It signifies that in case of a conflict between EU law and the law of the Member States, the EU law prevails. Its fundamental goal is to assure a unified and effective application of EU law in all Member States. The principle of primacy has been established by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This article discusses the principle of primacy, as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and focuses on its importance for the Member States. The legal theory divides Member States into three groups with regard to what their position on the primacy of EU law in relation to the national constitution is: Member States that acknowledge full primacy, Member States that acknowledge limited primacy of EU law in relation to the national constitution, and Member States that principally assume primacy of the national constitution over EU law. Within the context of the European hierarchy, the constitutional courts of the Member States are left with the central role and power of review of constitutionality, but it remains to be seen whether in future more constitutional courts will enter a dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union in the form of a preliminary ruling procedure

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Questions about the necessity to introduce uniform European consumer protection instruments in national procedural law count among the most divisive topics of contemporary consumer protection law. Thus, even though several European Union (EU) acts contain procedural provisions on the protection of consumers, the introduction of new procedural and remedial tools in this area of law remains controversial, as the Commission's initiatives on collective redress mechanisms clearly show. Against this background, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays a double role. On the one hand, the CJEU rules on the interpretation and the application of existing procedural consumer protection provisions of EU law, such as the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation on consumer contracts, which were interpreted in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof. On the other hand, the CJEU has developed a significant line of case law on the duties of national courts and tribunals in cases concerning the judicial enforcement of individuals' rights derived from the consumer protection directives. This case law, which started with Océano Grupo and culminated in VB Pénzügyi Lízing, can entail far-reaching duties for national courts and tribunals to take positive action in order to support consumers in their legal proceedings aimed at the enforcement of their rights. Nevertheless, as the ruling in Banco Español de Crédito has again made clear, it would be premature to analyse this line of case law of the CJEU as a one-way evolution towards an ever deeper intrusion in the procedural law systems of the Member States.