The Atlantic community shares more than just dependable expectations of peaceful change. Its members also share a reflexive political community they sense is worth preserving and a view that their security is intertwined. Existing accounts of the Atlantic security community have identified the importance of renewed emphasis on common values as a factor in preserving and expanding the security community after the Cold War. But, debates at the end of the Cold War also turned on the question of what the allies would do together and what responsibilities they had to each other and to other states. This article outlines a discursive framework and a set of rhetorical strategies used by members of the Atlantic community that explain how they worked to maintain and change their community during debates about their mandate for cooperation. This framework is then applied to the Atlantic community's debates over common action during the Yugoslav wars.

This paper examines the role of identity in shaping counter-terrorism policy in Canada. We show that identity functions in three ways: constitutively by defining the range of choices a state is likely to consider; strategically by being a resource to buttress arguments based in economic or sovereignty; and heuristically by using identity as a marker for risk. This three-faceted explanation helps explain why, despite close economic, social, and political links between Canada and the United States which might lead us to expect Canada to follow American counter-terrorism policy, Canadian counter-terrorism policy often diverges from the American lead.

Allegations of police brutality, unlawful detention, and other breaches of civil liberties during the G20 in Toronto in June 2010 provide an important case through which to understand the changing nature of security and policing, raising questions about the political implications of such shifts in terms of police accountability, transparency, and democracy. Within the field of public policing, scholars predicted that globalization processes would weaken public policing as a dominant policing institution. Instead, it has expanded, in part, through the convergence of internal and international dimensions of security, whereby new policy networks cooperate in matters of policing and security in a new integrated model, the result of which is a further militarization of urban space and expanded markets for security, leading to the securitization of everyday life. This article examines the case of Toronto's hosting of the G20 and the role that the Integrated Security Unit-led by the RCMP and including private security firms-played. By focusing on the role of multilateral networks that include private sector actors, we examine the implications of the privatization and securitization of policing for democracy, citizenship, and accountability, looking at how they affect the ability of publics to engage in public debate, to consult, or to protest policies.The dominant images that emerged from the G20 Meeting in Toronto in June 2010 were not the traditional family photos of world leaders coming together to advance their global initiatives, but rather those of street protests and violence in the context of a massive security operation and allegations of police brutality, unlawful detention, and other breaches of civil liberties (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011). Such scenes make the Toronto G20 an important case through which to understand both the changing nature of security-particularly in the post 9/11 period in which the market for security has grown-as well as the implications of a series of shifts in authority and governance for the nature of democracy and the urban citizen.Since the end of the Cold War, and more particularly since 9/11, scholars have observed that the distinction between inside and outside in international relations has blurred. As part of this transformation, within the area of security studies, Didier Bigo (2001) argues that the domains of internal policing and external defense are no longer separable, but instead merge into one another as part of a "M€ obius ribbon" of security networks. In this context, ideas about the meaning of security and the identities of enemies are no longer clear. Similarly, 1 We would like to thank John Zelenbaba, Rhys Machold, and Jesse Maclean, who provided research assistance for this paper.Kitchen

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Smarter cooperation inCanada-US relations? I N RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS of September 2001 and the heightened attention paid to issues of border security, Canada and the United States drafted the smart border declaration in December 2001.The declaration and its accompanying 30-point action plan called for initiatives to ensure the secure flow of people and goods, secure infrastructure, and co-ordinate enforcement and information-sharing about these objectives.' The smart border declaration was centred on several strategies its drafters hoped would make it a success. It included policy, technical, and bureaucratic cooperation coupled with highlevel political attention, and it was implemented across a defined issue area. By its second anniversary, most of the provisions of the smart Veronica Kitchen is a PhD candidate at Brown Universiy. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Association of Canadian Studies conference "9.11: Impact and Consequences for Canada and Canadians"' the International Studies Association Annual Conference; and the Institut d' tudes internationales/ Woodrow Wilson Center conference "Quels choix pour le Canada?! What choices for Canada?" The author would like to thank Peter Andreas andJens Hainmueller for their helpfiul comments on early drafts.i The text of the smart border declaration is accessible at www.whitehouse.gov and status reports are available through FAC'S Canadian-American relations website at www.can-am.gc.ca. The final declaration was signed on 9 September 2002 by President Bush and Prime Minister Chr~tien at a ceremony near the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. INTERNATIONAL JOURNALSummer 2004 2 A good overview of progress on the action plan as well as some caveats about the future is Andre Belelieu, "The Smart Border Process at Two: Losing Momentum?" Hemisphere Focus ii, no. 31, published by the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.