A defining feature of new nationalisms, with their right-wing populist rhetoric, is the way they exploit the regime of truth prevalent in liberal democratic societies. Their use of the language of democracy, human rights and identity is sometimes hard to differentiate from the mainstream convention. Despite being majoritarian in the way it seeks democratic legitimacy, new nationalist discourse consistently advances demands framed in terms of minority protection. This is done by presenting the existence of ‘our’ nation as threatened by overwhelming forces of neo-liberal globalisation (embodied in the EU, the West or even in ‘the Washington establishment’). By using the Pussy Riot case as an empirical example, this article argues that there is no way of preventing the language of minority protection from being hijacked by ‘predatory identities’ unless one foregrounds the universal dimension of equality and emancipation, as opposed to rights and entitlements associated with particular identities. The key political question today, as always, is how to navigate between the totalitarian disregard of the local and the parochialist concentration on the particular.

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The problem of sanctions effectiveness as a means of a regime change is one of the key issues for researchers in the field of sanctions policy. The case of U.S. and UN sanctions against Iraq is one of the most vivid examples of how sanctions can be effective in terms of limiting the undesirable international behavior of a country, while failing to instigate a regime change and severely hampering the social and economic conditions for general population. The article discusses the dynamics of restrictive measures against Iraq during Saddam Hussein regime, the problems of regimes adaptation to international sanctions as well as the evolution of U.S. and UN sanctions against the country. For this purpose the authors reviewed the key UN sanctions documents, as well as the evolution of the main aspects of Iraqi political regime with regards to the power distribution between different groups. The research shows that sanctions aimed at regime change failed to fulfill this task. Despite constantly degrading social and economic conditions, the Saddam Hussein regime demonstrated considerable resilience. This can be attributed primarily to the use of contradictions of complex tribal and religious composition of the country, as well as to oppression and a relatively effective re-distribution of the scarce resources between different power groups. Under these conditions, even the presence of intra-elite conflicts strengthened the regime, rather than weaken it. Another important factor was the very policy of external pressure on the elite and the country as a whole. The severity of restrictive measures was partially offset by the presence of programs such as “Oil-for-Food”, which, given the poor development of the programs themselves, as well as corruption schemes involving its executors, reduced pressure on the regime and, consequently, the effectiveness of sanctions. Thus these factors contributed to the ultimate failure of the sanctions policy towards Iraq in 1990-2003.

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В статье рассмотрены общие аспекты критики спекуляции в искажении рыночных цен и нанесения ущерба потребителям. Представлены некоторые преимущества спекуляции в принятии на себя рисков, а также дополнении информацией рынков и повышению их ликвидности. Раскрыты различия между спекуляцией, манипуляцией и раздуванием цен. Выявлены также различия между спекуляцией и излишней спекуляцией. Определено место спекуляции на рынке и ее социальная полезность в отличие от спекуляции других направлений: азартные игры, ценовая манипуляция и раздувание цен. The article discusses the General aspects of criticism of speculation in distorting market prices and causing harm to consumers. There are some advantages of speculation in taking risks, as well as adding information to markets and increasing their liquidity. The differences between speculation, manipulation and "inflating" prices are revealed. There are also differences between speculation and excessive speculation. The place of speculation in the market and its social utility in contrast to speculation in other areas is determined: gambling, price manipulation and "inflating" prices.