This article considers challenges for the European Union (EU) maternity and pregnancy rights framework when faced with advances in reproductive technology. Specifically, we consider how the introduction of the ‘artificial womb’ technology, an alternative to bodily gestation, would impact the availability of rights that exist under the maternity and discrimination framework. Employment rights in the EU context have already been confronted by the challenges of advancements in reproduction. We use the case law on in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy as a baseline for unpacking the challenges that ‘artificial wombs’ will bring. This analysis of the legal framework on maternity rights and sex discrimination will highlight potential avenues for integrating this technology and ensuring the continuation of rights for those opting for it. We advocate against the stratification of maternity and pregnancy rights based on the reproductive and gestational choices made by the pregnant person.

The approach in the United Kingdom to sex-based equal pay has for a long time been distinct from general sex discrimination and from equal pay based on other protected characteristics. This dichotomy allows for a greater focus on sex-based equal pay, in a distinct statutory regime, but also risks creating unnecessary, unintended and detrimental distinctions. This article outlines the different legislative approaches adopted in pursuit of related public policy goals regarding equality and explores, and suggests legislative and interpretative solutions to, a significant issue whereby problematic wording in the Equality Act 2010, and judicial interpretation of it, could unjustifiably leave sex-based claimants in a worse position than those with other protected characteristics with regard to both to injury to feelings and constructive dismissal.

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Equal pay litigation is often highly technical, with a drawn out and costly legal battle for claimants. This is somewhat because of the way equal pay law is constructed, as the requirement to have specific, named comparators can be an area of intense dispute. The complexity and length of cases look set to increase as the parameters of equal pay for work of equal value are explored, and occupational segregation is challenged in the employment tribunals and courts. This article considers one of the largest obstacles to quick and efficient equal pay litigation: the imbalance of access to information between employer and employee. The difficulties of applications for disclosure orders are discussed, alongside pay transparency measures and the recent proposals for a right to direct access to a suspected comparator’s pay data. We consider whether the proposed right is a viable, swifter route to information parity and greater efficiency in equal pay litigation, in light of the experience of freedom of information requests regarding equal pay. Specifically, we note the tension that may arise between the ‘Right to Know’ a comparator’s pay, and the data protection obligations of the employer.

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