No abstract

No abstract

Compared to continental areas, most islands have exceptionally long coastlines relative to their total land area. For this reason, islands are uncommonly vulnerable to problems associated with coasts. The future of the human inhabitants of many island states depends intrinsically on the sustainable management of their coasts, a challenge which grows more pressing as island populations increase and the associated demands on island coastlines change and grow. These issues are presented and discussed in this article. The mechanics of the sustainable management of island coasts is itself an important issue. At the national or local level, management is plagued by problems of insufficient and/or imprecise data and understanding that may lead to inappropriate solutions that even exacerbate the problems they are intended to solve. At an inter‐governmental or international level, problems associated with the understanding of island environments need to be resolved before optimal management strategies can be developed. This article presents a brief explanation of the nature of coastal vulnerability on oceanic islands, followed by a discussion of several key problems associated with their sustainable development and the role of human and non‐human factors in recent environmental change. It discusses the future of oceanic island coasts in the face of both internal and external threats to their sustainable management. It concludes with a blueprint for their survival.

No abstract

Purse seine fishing of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) raises concern over increasing impacts on yellowfin and bigeye tuna by-catch. To address sustainability concerns, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) adopted the vessel day scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing in the WCPO. The VDS has the potential to improve economic benefits for PNA members and to contribute to sustainability of the tuna stocks, and since 2012, has become an important mechanism to regulate fishing access rights in PNA waters. Despite this, monitoring and enforcement remains weak leading to violations of the agreement. Using a game theoretic framework, this paper examines the effectiveness of the VDS and its implications for fisheries regionalism. We examine the payoffs of member countries of the Nauru Agreement under full compliance and payoffs under the currently observed partial compliance. Our findings indicate that member states' partial compliance with VDS rules plays a role in stabilising the agreement. Requiring full compliance, on the other hand, may encompass strong incentives for PNA members to deviate from the VDS since third parties offer attractive benefits in return for privileged access to fishing grounds. However, pragmatic tolerance of deviations from full VDS compliance seems to play a facilitative role in promoting cooperation and fisheries regionalism.