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This paper sets out a moderate version of metaphysical structural realism that stands in contrast to both the epistemic structural realism of Worrall and the -radical -ontic structural realism of French and Ladyman. According to moderate structural realism, objects and relations (structure) are on the same ontological footing, with the objects being characterized only by the relations in which they stand. We show how this position fares well as regards philosophical arguments, avoiding the objections against the other two versions of structural realism. In particular, we set out how this position can be applied to space-time, providing for a convincing understanding of space-time points in the standard tensor formulation of general relativity as well as in the fibre bundle formulation. Moderate in contrast to radical structural realismStructural realism is a position in the philosophy of science that has been much debated recently. It is the view that only structure in the sense of the relations that are instantiated in the world is real or at least is all that we can know. The latter position is known as epistemic structural realism, the former one as ontic structural realism (this distinction goes back to Ladyman 1998). The main motivation of epistemic structural realism is to steer a middle course between the no miracle argument for scientific realism and the argument from pessimistic induction for instrumentalism. The main motivation -and application -of the form of ontic structural realism that has been developed hitherto is the interpretation of quantum physics. The aim of this paper is to set out (1) a moderate ontic or metaphysical structural realism that puts objects on the same footing as structure and (2) to apply this position to space-time, arguing in particular that it leads to a convincing view about spacetime points. The current discussion on structural realism goes back to Worrall (1989, in particular 117-123). Worrall's aim is to pay heed to both the argument from pessimistic induction -that is, the claim that since most of our past scientific theories have turned out to be false, it is likely that our present and future scientific theories will endure the same fate -and the no miracle argument, that is, the claim that the predictive success of our scientific theories would be a miracle if they were not tracking truth. Worrall's middle way consists in three theses: 1) Structure in the sense of relations among physical objects and as captured by the mathematical equations of a scientific theory is all that we can know. 2) There is continuity in our views about structure despite theory change: the views about structure of a predecessor theory can be construed as an approximation of the views about structure of the successor theory. 3) We cannot know the intrinsic properties of the physical objects that underlie structure.

This standardized intervention did not demonstrate any significant improvements in caregiver well-being but did result in a decrease in patient emergency department presentations and unplanned hospital readmissions in the immediate post-discharge period. The trend towards improvements in a number of caregiver outcomes and the improvement in health service utilization support further development of telephone-based caregiver-focused supportive care interventions.