A mirror effect can be produced by manipulating word class (e.g., high vs. low frequency) or by manipulating strength (e.g., short vs. long study time). The results of 5 experiments reported here suggest that a strength-based mirror effect is caused by a shift in the location of the decision criterion, whereas a frequency-based mirror effect occurs although the criterion remains fixed with respect to word frequency. Evidence supporting these claims is provided by a series of studies in which high frequency (HF) words were differentially strengthened (and sometimes differentially colored) during list presentation. That manipulation increased the HF hit rate above that for low frequency (LF) words without selectively decreasing the HF false alarm rate, just as a fixed-criterion account of the word-frequency mirror effect predicts.In recent years, a well-known empirical regularity known as the mirror effect has commanded a great deal of attention. The mirror effect refers to the relationship between hit and false alarm rates in two conditions associated with different levels of recognition accuracy. Specifically, a mirror effect is said to exist when the condition associated with more accurate recognition performance is characterized by both a higher hit rate and a lower false alarm rate than the less accurate condition. This effect is so reliably observed that Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, and Kim (1993) described it as a "regularity of recognition memory."The mirror effect can be produced by manipulating either the class or the strength of the items presented for study. The most common class manipulation is based on word frequency (high vs. low), whereas strength is usually manipulated by varying study time or number of item presentations. The consistency of the mirror effect across different methods of manipulating recognition accuracy suggests the influence of a single underlying mechanism. In terms of signal detection theory, that mechanism is often thought to be a shift in the criterion for deciding whether to respond "yes" or "no" to a test item. Figure 1 illustrates the criterion-shift argument for a strength manipulation using the standard assumptions of signal detection theory. This model assumes that the decision axis represents a strength-of-evidence variable, such as familiarity. According to this account, the familiarity values associated with the target items and lure items are both normally distributed, with the mean of the target distribution Strength-Based Mirror Effects

and VINCENT STRETCH University of Southern Mississippi Gulf Coast, Long Beach, Mississippi Donaldson (1996) argued that remember/know judgments can be conceptualized within a signal detection framework by assuming that they are based on two criteria situated along a strength-of-memory decision axis. According to this model, items that exceed a high criterion receive a remember response, whereas items that only exceed a lower criterion receive a know response. Although a variety of findings have been presented in evidence against this idea, Dunn (2004) recently showed that detection theory is fully compatible with those findings. We present a variety of new results and new analyses that weigh strongly in favor of the detection interpretation. We further show that a dual-process account of recognition memory is compatible with a unidimensional detection model despite the common notion that such a model necessarily assumes a single process. The key assumption of this model is that individual recognition decisions are based on both recollection and familiarity (not on one process or the other).

Smokers (N = 3,030) were randomized to receive 1 of 3 interventions: (a) a self-help quit kit, (b) a quit kit plus 1 telephone counseling session, or (c) a quit kit plus up to 6 telephone counseling sessions, scheduled according to relapse probability. Both counseling groups achieved significantly higher abstinence rates than the self-help group. The rates for having quit for at least 12 months by intention to treat were 5.4% for self-help, 7.5% for single counseling, and 9.9% for multiple counseling. The 12-month continuous abstinence rates for those who made a quit attempt were 14.7% for self-help, 19.8% for single counseling, and 26.7% for multiple counseling. A dose-response relation was observed, as multiple sessions produced significantly higher abstinence rates than a single session. The first week after quitting seems to be the critical period for intervention.Telephone counseling has attracted increasing interest as an alternative system for delivery of services in the field of smoking cessation (e.g., Anderson, Duffy, Hallet, & Marcus, 1992;Curry, McBride, Louie, Grothaus, & Wagner, 1992;DeBusk et al., 1994; Lando, Hellerstedt, Pirie, & McGovern, 1992;Orleans et al., 1991;Ossip-Klein et al., 1991;Prochaska, DiClemente, Velicer, & Rossi, 1993;Shiffman, Read, Maltese, Rapkin, & Jarvik, 1985). From the smoker's standpoint, its main attractions are accessibility and convenience. There are no transportation difficulties and fewer scheduling conflicts than in most other cessation programs. Also, receiving counseling in the privacy of one's home provides treatment access to individuals who might not normally seek "counseling" to quit smoking. These factors encourage smokers to use the service (Zhu etal., 1995 cantly increases the success rate (e.g., Orleans et al., 1991;Ossip-Klein et al., 1991), others report only a short-term effect, with the long-term outlook no better than that of selfhelp(e.g., Curry etal., 1992; Lando etal., 1992). Those studies that have shown a significant intervention effect for telephone counseling, however, did not include a randomized design to test for a dose-response relation between the number of sessions and the treatment effect.The present study examined the effects of two levels of telephone counseling and compared them with the effects of a selfhelp approach. The lower intensity counseling consisted of one session before quitting. The higher intensity counseling included the same pre-quit session plus up to five sessions after the smoker had quit. We tested two hypotheses: (a) that counseling would produce a higher abstinence rate than a self-help quit kit, and (b) that multiple sessions of counseling would produce a higher abstinence rate than a single session.

According to the standard signal-detection model of recognition memory, confidence judgments for recognition responses are reached in much the same way that old-new decisions are reached (i.e., on the basis of criteria situated along the strength-of-evidence axis). The question investigated here is how the confidence criteria shift when recognition accuracy is manipulated across conditions. Although several theories assume that the old-new decision criterion shifts when recognition accuracy changes, less is known about how the confidence criteria move. An analysis of data previously reported by R. Ratcliff, G. McKoon, and M. Tindall (1994) and some new data reported here suggest that the confidence criteria fan out on the decision axis as d' decreases. This result is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of a likelihood ratio model, although the data did not support the stronger quantitative predictions of this account.

M. B. Miller and G. L. Wolford (1999) argued that the high false-alarm rate associated with critical lures in the Roediger-McDermott (H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995) paradigm results from a criterion shift and therefore does not reflect false memory. This conclusion, which is based on new data reported by Miller and Wolford, overlooks the fact that Roediger and McDermott's false-memory account is as compatible with the new findings as the criterion-shift account is. Furthermore, a consideration of prior work concerned with investigating the conditions under which participants are and are not inclined to adjust the decision criterion suggests that the criterion-shift account of false memory is unlikely to be correct.