Bank of ItalyA large body of empirical evidence suggests that bank loan margins are countercyclical. We develop a model where a countercyclical spread arises due to the strategic interaction between large intermediaries-i.e., banks whose individual behavior affects macroeconomic outcomes-and the central bank. We uncover a new mechanism related to market power of banks which amplifies the impact of monetary and technology shocks on the real economy. The level of the spread is positively connected to the level of entrepreneurs' leverage, and the amplification effect is stronger the more aggressive the central bank's response to inflation.

No abstract

Following the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), concerns about having a level playing field become more important due to the heterogeneity in bank taxation rules across Europe: measuring the tax burden can provide a first rough measure of the extent of heterogeneity across countries. After a review of the main differences in banks taxation between Italy, France, Germany, Spain and the UK, the paper provides estimates for the tax burden and deferred tax assets in these countries over the years 2006-2014; the impact of differences in taxation on bank profitability is also examined. Moreover, the paper carries out a more in-depth analysis of Italian banks by considering both individual balance sheet data and aggregate tax return data. The impact of tax measures on financial stability and on profitability is further analysed. The comparative analysis points to a wide heterogeneity across countries in the tax treatment of the banking sector. This suggests that it would be advantageous to explore possible ways to make the tax systems of the countries participating in the SSM more homogeneous; a first step could be to harmonize tax bases.JEL Classification: G21, H25, H87, K34.

This paper sheds light on the real effects of foreign central bank's degree of inflation aversion in presence of non-atomistic wage setters. It extends the Lippi's (2003) framework to an open economy and identifies the key strategic mechanisms between monetary policy and wage-setting decisions so as to assess the real effects of domestic and foreign policy makers' aversion to inflation. A main finding is that foreign central bank's aversion to inflation always increases employment. The impact of domestic central bank's aversion to inflation instead depends on the combination of three strategic effects.

This paper sheds light on the real effects of foreign central bank's degree of inflation aversion in presence of non-atomistic wage setters. It extends the Lippi's (2003) framework to an open economy and identifies the key strategic mechanisms between monetary policy and wage-setting decisions so as to assess the real effects of domestic and foreign policy makers' aversion to inflation. A main finding is that foreign central bank's aversion to inflation always increases employment. The impact of domestic central bank's aversion to inflation instead depends on the combination of three strategic effects.