Abstract. Websites today routinely combine JavaScript from multiple sources, both trusted and untrusted. Hence, JavaScript security is of paramount importance. A specific interesting problem is information flow control (IFC) for JavaScript. In this paper, we develop, formalize and implement a dynamic IFC mechanism for the JavaScript engine of a production Web browser (specifically, Safari's WebKit engine). Our IFC mechanism works at the level of JavaScript bytecode and hence leverages years of industrial effort on optimizing both the source to bytecode compiler and the bytecode interpreter. We track both explicit and implicit flows and observe only moderate overhead. Working with bytecode results in new challenges including the extensive use of unstructured control flow in bytecode (which complicates lowering of program context taints), unstructured exceptions (which complicate the matter further) and the need to make IFC analysis permissive. We explain how we address these challenges, formally model the JavaScript bytecode semantics and our instrumentation, prove the standard property of terminationinsensitive non-interference, and present experimental results on an optimized prototype.

Language-based information flow control (IFC) tracks dependencies within a program using sensitivity labels and prohibits public outputs from depending on secret inputs. In particular, literature has proposed several type systems for tracking these dependencies. On one extreme, there are finegrained type systems (like Flow Caml) that label all values individually and track dependence at the level of individual values. On the other extreme are coarse-grained type systems (like HLIO) that track dependence coarsely, by associating a single label with an entire computation context and not labeling all values individually.In this paper, we show that, despite their glaring differences, both these styles are, in fact, equally expressive. To do this, we show a semantics-and type-preserving translation from a coarse-grained type system to a fine-grained one and vice-versa. The forward translation isn't surprising, but the backward translation is: It requires a construct to arbitrarily limit the scope of a context label in the coarse-grained type system (e.g., HLIO's "toLabeled" construct). As a separate contribution, we show how to extend work on logical relation models of IFC types to higher-order state. We build such logical relations for both the fine-grained type system and the coarsegrained type system. We use these relations to prove the two type systems and our translations between them sound.

This paper presents λ-amor, a new type-theoretic framework for amortized cost analysis of higher-order functional programs and shows that existing type systems for cost analysis can be embedded in it. λ-amor introduces a new modal type for representing potentials – costs that have been accounted for, but not yet incurred, which are central to amortized analysis. Additionally, λ-amor relies on standard type-theoretic concepts like affineness, refinement types and an indexed cost monad. λ-amor is proved sound using a rather simple logical relation. We embed two existing type systems for cost analysis in λ-amor showing that, despite its simplicity, λ-amor can simulate cost analysis for different evaluation strategies (call-by-name and call-by-value), in different styles (effect-based and coeffect-based), and with or without amortization. One of the embeddings also implies that λ-amor is relatively complete for all terminating PCF programs.

Web browsers routinely handle private information. Owing to a lax security model, browsers and JavaScript in particular, are easy targets for leaking sensitive data. Prior work has extensively studied information flow control (IFC) as a mechanism for securing browsers. However, two central aspects of web browsers -the Document Object Model (DOM) and the event handling mechanism -have so far evaded thorough scrutiny in the context of IFC. This paper advances the state-of-the-art in this regard. Based on standard specifications and the code of an actual browser engine, we build formal models of both the DOM (up to Level 3) and the event handling loop of a typical browser, enhance the models with fine-grained taints and checks for IFC, prove our enhancements sound and test our ideas through an instrumentation of WebKit, an inproduction browser engine. In doing so, we observe several channels for information leak that arise due to subtleties of the event loop and its interaction with the DOM.