The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them.

The main object of this paper is a rare syndrome in human pain experience, known as the pain asymbolia. The first thing that will be considered in this paper is the nature of pain asymbolia. I will try to examine and prove professor Grahek's claim that pain asymbolia differs from other dissociation syndromes in human pain experience. Also, the special attention will be given to Grahek's claim that typical cases of indifference to pain are not the cases of radical or total indifference to pain. Finally, it will be shown how pain asymbolia can be used against some famous arguments in the philosophy of mind. Namely, it can be used to undermine both the subjectivist and the objectivist conceptions of pain. More specifically, it can be used to disprove the functionalist interpretation of pain and the perceptual or representational model of pain. Also, pain asymbolia can be used against the subjectivist view, according to which the sensation of pain is to be considered as the essential component of pain

According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New's argument, along with the epistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of 'punishment'. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position.

Jedan od najozbiljnijih problema u filozofiji je neobična i krajnje neprijatna činjenica da se termini koriste na višesmislen i nejasan način. Upravo to je slučaj sa terminom "retribucija" (retribution). Naime, u filozofskoj literaturi o kazni jako često se događa da se mnoge teorije nazivaju "retributivnim teorijama kazne", kao i to da se vrlo široko i na krajnje višesmislen način upotrebljava termin "retribucija". Šta zapravo znači "retribucija"? Da li sve teorije koje se klasifikuju kao retributivne zaista mogu da se ispravno okarakterišu na taj način? To su ključna pitanja na koja Džon Kotingem nastoji da odgovori u svom tekstu. Glavni cilj ovog rada je da se predstavi klasifikacija retributivnih teorija koju Kotingem izvodi, da se objasni njen značaj, kao i njeni eventualni nedostaci. Pokazaće se da je Kotingemova klasifikacija, uprkos nekim nedostacima i nedoslednostima, još uvek jedna od najtemeljnijih analiza retributivnih teorija kazne koja je napisana u okviru radova koji spadaju u filozofiju kazne.

According to R.M.Hare, the primary function of the value-words is to commend Also, in his opinion, whenever we commend something, it is always in order to, at least indirectly, guide choices. This thesis was very often questioned. In his article 'Objectivism and Mr. Hare's Language of Morals' professor Sidney Zink attempts to prove that Hare's central thesis is incorrect. My primary contention in this paper is to demonstrate that professor Zink's argumentation is quite unworkable. At the same time, this contention represents one step further in justification of internalism