This article introduces the first comprehensive dataset of frozen conflicts in world politics. It draws on a new, broader conceptualization of frozen conflicts that revolves around an unresolved core issue between the warring parties and transcends the common understanding of frozen conflicts as a recent, post-Soviet phenomenon. The authors identify 42 cases of such conflicts between 1946 and 2011 that include conflict dyads involving both regular states and ‘de facto states’. The article describes the process of dataset construction, presents summary statistics, and identifies key patterns concerning conflict onset, escalation, and resolution. In addition, it provides a comparison of the dataset with enduring rivalries and strategic rivalries to situate it within existing research on conflict escalation and conflict resolution. The dataset is presented in a cross-sectional format compatible with the Correlates of War and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that can be used by other researchers in peace and conflict studies to provide new insights into the dynamics of frozen conflicts.

Cílem článku je rozebrat současnou situaci debaty o hybridní válce, konkrétně pak paradox spočívající v úspěchu konceptu navzdory jeho široké odborné kritice. Specificky pak článek jako pravděpodobné vysvětlení této situace diskutuje pragmatismus v užívání konceptu na straně institucí i autorů a analyzuje jeho možné příčiny, se zaměřením na vývoj a konceptuální kvality a možné následky stávající situace.

The debate on the failure of the efforts to avert the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is dominated by two narratives presented as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, 'hawks' chastise the West for failing to forcefully confront Russian adventurism earlier. On the other hand, 'realists' criticise the West's overreach in efforts to incorporate Ukraine into the Western structures. Both views implicitly contend that there was only one way to prevent the war. This paper argues that those positions are, in fact, not incompatible and failure to prevent war lies in the habitual mismatch between strategic goals and resources, implicitly recognised by both sides of the debate. Ambitious goals and meagre resources constituted a middle-of-the-road compromise, inadvertently increasing the risk of the war by encouraging Russia to take the opportunity to challenge the West's weakly backed ambitions. In an attempt to draw some tentative lessons, the paper concludes by exploring some hypotheses on why such mismatches between goals and resources occur and persist.

The article discusses the implications of a potential outbreak of high-intensity violent conflict between the United States and China in Pacific for the defence of NATO’s eastern flank. It identifies limits of American ability to simultaneously project force to two distant regions as potentially critical weakness in case of concurrent conflict in Asia and threat to the eastern flank.