We consider a model that demonstrates the crucial role of inertia and stickiness in multi-agent systems, based on the Minority Game (MG). The inertia of an agent is introduced into the game model by allowing agents to apply hypothesis testing when choosing their best strategies, thereby reducing their reactivity towards changes in the environment. We find by extensive numerical simulations that our game shows a remarkable improvement of global cooperation throughout the whole phase space. In other words, the maladaptation behavior due to over-reaction of agents is removed. These agents are also shown to be advantageous over the standard ones, which are sometimes too sensitive to attain a fair success rate. We also calculate analytically the minimum amount of inertia needed to achieve the above improvement. Our calculation is consistent with the numerical simulation results. Finally, we review some related works in the field that show similar behaviors and compare them to our work.

Minority game is a simple-mined econophysical model capturing the cooperative behavior among selfish players. Previous investigations, which were based on numerical simulations up to about 100 players for a certain parameter alpha in the range 0.1 < approximately alpha < approximately 1, suggested that memory is irrelevant to the cooperative behavior of the minority game in the so-called symmetric phase. Here using a large scale numerical simulation up to about 3000 players in the parameter range 0.01 < approximately alpha < approximately 1, we show that the mean variance of the attendance in the minority game actually depends on the memory in the symmetric phase. We explain such dependence in the framework of crowd-anticrowd theory. Our findings conclude that one should not overlook the feedback mechanism buried under the correlation in the history time series in the study of minority game.

Many agents in the real world are reluctant to change their mind. Such an “inertial” behavior may affect the dynamics and cooperation of agents. Here we study the effect of “inertia” in the framework of Minority Game by requiring agents to choose their strategies via hypothesis testing. We find both numerically and semi-analytically that the presence of “inertial” agents greatly improves global cooperation of the system.

In the standard Minority Game, players use historical minority choices as the sole public information to pick one out of the two alternatives. However, publishing historical minority choices is not the only way to present global system information to players when more than two alternatives are available. Thus, it is instructive to study the dynamics and cooperative behaviors of this extended game as a function of the global information provided. We numerically find that although the system dynamics depends on the kind of public information given to the players, the degree of cooperation follows the same trend as that of the standard Minority Game. We also explain most of our findings by the crowd-anticrowd theory.

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