The problem of self-disclosure is explored in relation to currently shifting paradigms of the nature of the analytic relation and analytic interaction. Relational and intersubjective perspectives emphasize the role of self-disclosure as not merely allowable, but as an essential facilitating aspect of the analytic dialogue, in keeping with the role of the analyst as a contributing partner in the process. At the opposite extreme, advocates of classical anonymity stress the importance of neutrality and abstinence. The paper seeks to chart a course between unconstrained self-disclosure and absolute anonymity, both of which foster misalliances. Self-disclosure is seen as at times contributory to the analytic process, and at times deleterious. The decision whether to self-disclose, what to disclose, and when and how, should be guided by the analyst's perspective on neutrality, conceived as a mental stance in which the analyst assesses and decides what, at any given point, seems to contribute to the analytic process and the patient's therapeutic benefit. The major risk in self-disclosure is the tendency to draw the analytic interaction into the real relation between analyst and patient, thus diminishing or distorting the therapeutic alliance, mitigating transference expression, and compromising therapeutic effectiveness.

In addition to the findings of neuroscientific research on brain function, reviewed in the previous articles (Meissner, 2006a, 2006b), contemporary findings relevant to the mind-brain relation derive also from the study of the underlying patterns of brain dysfunction related to various forms of psychopathology. Other information derives from study of split-brain conditions and from research on dream processes and their relation to brain mechanisms. Review of these research findings casts further light on aspects of the mind-brain relation and further substantiates a unified theory of mind-brain integration.

Concepts of neutrality and abstinence are discussed in terms of the variant opinions about them, pro and con, with particular reference to efforts to dispense with them based on the unavoidable role of the analyst's personal influence and subjectivity in the analytic process. Stereotypes of both neutrality and abstinence are examined, and the therapeutic alliance established as the most appropriate context within which to articulate the essential and constructive role of effective analytic neutrality and abstinence. The alliance is not possible without the persistent exercise of both neutrality and abstinence; conversely, other components of the alliance are intended to facilitate and preserve neutrality and abstinence on the part of both analyst and analysand. These elements are essential factors in effective analytic practice.

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Freud recognized the power of religious beliefs and belief systems when he called them "illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind" (1927/1961, p. 30). However, for Freud, as is well-known, such illusions were essentially neurotic-residues of infantile dependence creating powerful gods to which man could turn for support and reassurance in the face of the painful difficulties of life and the irreducible disillusionments of loss and ultimately death. In the half century and more since Freud's death, the psychoanalytic understanding of religious beliefs and their role in psychic life has advanced well beyond his agnostic and pessimistic outlook (