This paper examines the role of the Morton Thiokol engineers in the decisions surrounding the launch of the Challenger, particularly with reference to an analysis of this event by Edward Tufte. The engineers at Morton Thiokol recommended against the launch of Challenger because the projected launch temperature between 26 degrees F to 29 degrees F was far outside their field database of successful launches. The engineers had asked for, but not received, data necessary to determine the cause of massive blow-by on the launch the previous January, and they had informed their managers and NASA that continuing flights could be catastrophic if the cause of the problems with the launches was not discovered. The authors conclude that the engineers thus did what they were ethically as well as professionally obligated to do.

Nanotechnology is developing far faster than our understanding of its effects. This lapping of our understanding by speedy development is typical of new technologies, and in the United States we let development occur, introducing new artifacts into the world, without any serious attempt to understand beforehand their effects, long-term or short-term. We have been willing to pay the price of pushing the technological envelope, but pushing the nanotechnological envelope has some special risks, requiring more caution.

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