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We investigate the role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in corporate risk‐taking. Using a sample of publicly listed French family firms over the period 2003−2012, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS are associated with higher risk‐taking. Our results suggest that MLS help restrain the propensity of family owners to undertake low‐risk investments. This effect is much stronger in firms that are more susceptible to agency conflicts. The results highlight the important governance role played by MLS in family firms and may explain why MLS are associated with higher firm performance.

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This paper examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on debt choice. Using a sample of 654 French‐listed firms over the period 1998‐2013, we find that reliance on bank debt increases with the presence and voting power of MLS. This result is robust to endogeneity concerns and to several sensitivity tests. Moreover, we find that the effect of MLS on debt choice is more pronounced when agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders are more severe. Taken together, our results suggest that MLS reduce the controlling owner's incentive to avoid bank monitoring, leading to greater reliance on bank debt.