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This commentary analyzes the relationship of fraud risk assessments to other risk assessments by auditors. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board notes that this is a problem area of current practice. Effective detection of fraudulent financial reporting requires an integrative accounting/auditing conceptual framework. As a result, this paper is as much about accounting theory as it is about auditing. To simplify the development of such an integrated framework, this paper uses an expanded risk model. This effectively results in a risk perspective on fraudulent financial reporting. There are many potential implications but the major findings are as follows. First, the study identifies the crucial role of benchmarks based on acceptable levels of risk to help differentiate between intentional and unintentional misstatements. Such differentiation is critical to successfully implementing the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Statement on Auditing Standards ( SAS ) No. 99 and international standards ISA Nos. 240 , 540 , and 700 . Second, the paper shows the importance of not allowing the major categories of risks identified here from getting too high. This paper explains the need to set acceptable levels of these risks, either by standard-setters as a matter of broad policy, or by individual practitioners as part of the terms of specific engagements. I propose that a major factor in the concept of "present fairly" be the acceptable levels of accounting risks that are defined here, especially the risks due to intentional forecast errors. Third, this paper clarifies how the fraud risk of SAS No. 99 , and similar international standards, relates to the current audit risk model framework.

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During the most recent financial crisis, the economic difficulties, along with potentially high uncertainties associated with fair value estimates, increased the audit risks for bank auditors. We analyze a sample of US public banks during the crisis (2008-09) and after the crisis (2010-11), and provide contrasting evidence concerning auditors' role in conservative financial reporting (proxied by higher discretionary loan loss provisions). Specifically, we document a significant positive association between discretionary loan loss provisions and the role of auditors (proxied by higher amounts of audit fees and abnormal audit fees) during the crisis. However, the positive association disappears following the financial crisis. Similarly, we document that during the crisis, auditors are less likely to issue unmodified audit opinions to banks that subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Thus, our evidence is consistent with elevated auditor conservatism for the sample banks during the financial crisis. Our evidence also suggests that bank auditors raise fees more to maintain accounting quality than to price protect from aggressive accounting choices.

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