This research examines the cross-sectional effect of intellectual capital investment, financial measures of market and company specific risk, industry membership and corporate governance on the extent of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital (VDIC) in a sample of 443 FTSE All Share Index company annual reports for the year 2003/2004. The extent of disclosure is measured by a disclosure index (DI) based on intellectual capital (IC) attributes included in the narratives and illustrations of the annual reports. The research predicts that agency costs are mitigated by VDIC and that the benefits of signalling IC may outweigh competitive and proprietary costs that may be more prevalent in innovative and technological companies; furthermore, that effective corporate governance measures enhance VDIC particularly in those companies found to have a higher level of intangible assets (IA) in their resource base. The results suggest that companies associated with less financial risk, reduced debt, higher levels of liquidity and accompanied by growth are characterised with higher levels of VDIC. Although less significant, the results on market risk indicate a positive influence on VDIC. Furthermore, the extent of VDIC in annual reports is enhanced when large companies operating in high-tech and innovative industries are characterised by investments in employees; in contrast, companies associated with research and development processes tend to be more secretive with respect to VDIC. The results suggest that companies that are able to maintain adequate governance systems through segregation of executive and non-executive duties and to a less extent through the presence of experienced non-executive directors exhibit higher levels of disclosure.

The paper investigates corporate governance mechanisms and the voluntary disclosure of intangible assets as determinants of corporate reputation. Reputation scores from Management Today Britain's "Most Admired Companies" 2004 survey are applied as a measure of corporate reputation. A content analysis method is applied to UK 2003UK /2004 annual reports in establishing the voluntary disclosure index which consists of structural, relational and human capital attributes. This paper suggests that when the resource based view of the firm is applied together with signalling theory, both the presence and disclosure of corporate governance structures and intangible resources is important if markets are to acknowledge a firm's quality and reputation; the agency approach is twofold, on the one hand the existence of governance structures allows firms to draw on various corporate governance mechanisms that may align directors' interests with the firm's objectives; on the other hand, governance mechanisms may enhance accountability and transparency through disclosure and therefore mitigate risks associated with asymmetry of information. The results of the analysis indicate that financial performance and growth enhance corporate reputation whereas directors' share ownership and executive remuneration appear to hinder the development and maintenance of corporate reputation. The presence of financial expertise on the audit committee is a governance mechanism that appears to be employed by firms whose strategy comprises building and developing corporate reputation. In addition, maintenance of lower voluntary disclosure of intangible assets appears to appeal to firms with higher levels of corporate reputation whereas, although the relationship is weaker, higher levels of financial gearing lead to lower corporate reputations as perceived by stakeholders. Furthermore, the results indicate that the proportion of experienced non-executive directors to total directors is insignificant in explaining the variation in corporate reputation. Management strategies differ significantly as they may be tailored to build and develop corporate reputation or tailored to maintain such reputations once attained.

This study analysed the nexus among ICT support for core competencies, competitive advantage and firm performance using data obtained from managers of firms in Harare, Zimbabwe. The qualitative phenomenological approach focused on the manufacturing and service sub-sectors that informed the analysis. The study used purposive sampling to select a sample of 10 participants, five business managers and five ICT experts. In-depth interviews with chosen ICT experts from business organisations in Harare, Zimbabwe, were conducted to gather qualitative data. The study's findings were from using within-case and cross-case qualitative data analysis. Key results from the study indicate that ICT support for management talent is perceived to impact business performance and competitive advantage positively. ICT support for core competencies gives businesses a competitive advantage that positively impacts operational performance. When ICT investments combine with ICT management skills, a company's value maximises. For ICT-enabled core competencies to influence firm performance, firms need complementary managerial and strategic capabilities. This study is distinctive because it addresses the dynamic organisational capabilities and resource-based perspective as the base theories. The methodology goes against the innovation adoption theories of comparable earlier studies on ICT acceptability. Thus, this study contributes to the growing body of ICT literature by demonstrating that ICT-enabled core competencies are insufficient to establish and maintain a competitive advantage and singularly influence firm performance. It made it even more essential for a firm to consider how to meet better customer needs and capture value by having a well-thought-out ICT-embedded business model, business strategy, and innovation alignment

The paper investigates the determinants of intangible asset disclosure with reference to the interaction of heterogeneous asset and governance characteristics of firms. Specifically, it considers R&D intensity as a measure of asset heterogeneity and multiple proxies for the effectiveness of the firm's corporate governance mechanisms and structures of accountability. Intellectual capital attributes are applied as the measure of disclosure quality and as the signalling mechanism through which management are able to inform markets of their competitive advantage. By applying the resource based view of the firm and signalling theory, the paper extends prior research on the determinants of intangibles disclosure through an analytical framework that examines the interaction of firm resources, corporate governance and intangibles disclosure. The theoretical framework combines the RBV of the firm in confirming intangibles as a necessary feature of disclosing firms' asset base and signalling as the means with which management disclose their competitive advantage. The results of the analysis indicate a positive relationship between R&D intensity, complexity and scope of activity and the presence of quality signalling responses. Also, the separation of the roles of chair and non-executive director, complemented by experienced non-executive directors promote quality signalling through the disclosure of intellectual capital attributes. These findings support the view that corporate governance mechanisms are only effective when applied in combination. Governance mechanisms bring about transparency and accountability through disclosure of these intangibles despite the potential competitive losses. The lack of proprietary costs that might otherwise restrict disclosure might be attributed to competitors' inability to imitate such intellectual capital resources and therefore their inability to duplicate such signals. The findings confirm the interaction between heterogeneous assets and governance mechanisms in the disclosure of intangibles as signalling mechanisms for management.

This paper examines the cross-sectional effect of investment in employees and investment in research and development on the extent of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital of 443 FTSE All Share Index companies for the year 2003/2004. The extent of disclosure is measured by a disclosure index based on intellectual capital attributes included in the narratives and illustrations of the annual reports. The paper predicts that agency costs may be minimised through voluntary disclosure. In addition, that in some industries, the benefits of signalling valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable attributes may outweigh the competitive costs of reporting this information. The results suggest that large companies operating in non-manufacturing, high-tech and innovative industries that are characterised by investment in employees and research and development processes have higher levels of hidden value; these companies are associated with the signalling of intellectual capital.