MycoBank, a registration system for fungi established in 2004 to capture all taxonomic novelties, acts as a coordination hub between repositories such as Index Fungorum and Fungal Names. Since January 2013, registration of fungal names is a mandatory requirement for valid publication under the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi and plants (ICN). This review explains the database innovations that have been implemented over the past few years, and discusses new features such as advanced queries, registration of typification events (MBT numbers for lecto, epi- and neotypes), the multi-lingual database interface, the nomenclature discussion forum, annotation system, and web services with links to third parties. MycoBank has also introduced novel identification services, linking DNA sequence data to numerous related databases to enable intelligent search queries. Although MycoBank fills an important void for taxon registration, challenges for the future remain to improve links between taxonomic names and DNA data, and to also introduce a formal system for naming fungi known from DNA sequence data only. To further improve the quality of MycoBank data, remote access will now allow registered mycologists to act as MycoBank curators, using Citrix software.

We report on a 2.5 Gbit/s transmission experiment at 645 nm wavelength using a PMMA–GI–POF with a core diameter of 500 μm reaching a record distance of 200 m. The result is obtained owing to the use of a very sensitive silicon APD receiver, a laser source with a narrow spectral width, a fiber with improved performance, and low‐loss optical interconnection between the components. ©1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Microwave Opt Technol Lett 20: 163–166, 1999.

We analyze ways in which heterogeneity in responsiveness to incentives (“drive”) affects employees' incentives and firms' incentive systems in a career concerns model. On the one hand, because more driven agents work harder in response to existing incentives than less driven ones—and therefore pay is increasing in perceived drive—there is a motive to increase effort to signal high drive. These “drive‐signaling incentives” are strongest with intermediate levels of existing incentives. On the other hand, because past output of a more driven agent will seem to the principal to reflect lower ability, there is an incentive to decrease effort to signal low drive. The former effect dominates early in the career, and the latter effect dominates towards the end. To maximize incentives, the principal wants to observe a noisy measure of the agent's effort—such as the number of hours he works—early but not late in his career. (JEL: C70, D82, D23)

No abstract