The importance imposed on corporate social responsibility (CSR) is greater in developed economies than in emerging markets. The pressures from various stakeholder groups on the CSR are expected to have substantial spillover impact on companies domiciled in emerging economies that obtain revenues from companies in developed economies. Based on the data from 1,330 listed companies in China, the largest emerging economy in the world, this study provides evidence that the CSR performance of China firms is positively related to the degree of their internationalization, and such a positive association is less pronounced for state-owned enterprises. Our findings support the hypothesis that internationalized companies in emerging economies are motivated to improve their CSR practices to address concerns from their importers or outsourcers in developed economies.

SYNOPSIS This study examines whether and how corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure plays a role in firms' choices of public versus private debt financing. We find that borrowing firms with higher levels of CSR disclosure tend to rely more on public debt than private debt. Further analyses reveal that the relation between CSR disclosure and firms' reliance on public debt is stronger for borrowing firms with higher financial reporting quality, and with standalone or externally assured CSR reports. In addition, we find that borrowing firms with higher levels of CSR disclosure tend to issue bonds at more favorable terms (i.e., lower bond yield spread and longer maturity). Together, our findings are consistent with the notion that nonfinancial CSR disclosure plays an incrementally important role in a firm's debt placement decisions. JEL Classifications: G32; M14; M21. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.

Using earnings announcement events made by group member firms in Hong Kong, this study examines the governance role of boards of directors in curbing propping activities within family business groups. We find that earnings released by group member firms affect the stock prices of their nonannouncing group peers in a manner consistent with intragroup propping. More importantly, this effect is less pronounced when the announcing firms have a larger board or a board with a higher proportion of independent directors, but more pronounced when they have an executive director from their controlling families acting as board chairperson. Furthermore, the monitoring effect of boards of directors is strengthened for firms subject to new regulations increasing board power. Our results suggest that board oversight can mitigate propping activities.