In this article, we argue that the economic and financial crisis that began in Mexico in 2008 has not been primarily caused by the US crisis that began in 2007, as many have argued. As we will show, years of misguided economic policies at the national level have been at the heart of the Mexican crisis. On the one hand, the dominance of foreign banks in the country's financial system and the minimal presence of the public banks have greatly limited the range of counter‐cyclical policy options available to authorities. On the other hand, in the face of the crisis, Mexico has continuously applied deflationary Washington Consensus policies that have deepened the economic contraction. This article will focus on Mexico's individual problems, which offer important lessons for other Latin American countries with a shared recent history of Washington Consensus policies.
This paper analyzes a seldom discussed aspect of Argentina's banking crisis of 2001-2002: the conflict that arose between foreign banks and the national government over the economic policies applied in response to the banking crisis. In particular, the paper will examine the foreign banks' strategy to dollarize the economy and to impede the national government's strategy of pesofication.
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