While democratization is regularly associated with elite renewal, established elites often succeed in maintaining their dominance after the fall of the authoritarian regime that fostered them. This constitutes a relatively understudied challenge facing democratization processes: when and how do democratic reforms succeed in fostering the emergence of new elites? This paper addresses this question through a study of village head elections in three rural districts around Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Comparing older studies of village head elections with ten in-depth studies of recent village head elections as well as assessments of the backgrounds of eighty village heads (kepala desa), this paper shows that a remarkable change has taken place. Whereas up to ten years ago many villages were still ruled by leaders from established families with a quasi-hereditary grip on power, in recent years such leaders are rapidly being replaced by village heads with more modest family backgrounds and a different style of leadership. This important change has resulted from a combination of democratic reforms, the diversification of rural economies, and the particularly competitive character of village head elections. Elite renewal is possible when open and information-dense elections coincide with a process of economic diversification undercutting the economic dominance of established elites.

Corruption action develops way more advance compare to corruption studies in Indonesia. Corruption studies are mostly focusing on institutional corruption or using an institutional approach to understand corruption. This research offers to understand corruption better using actor-based and network approaches. Utilising social network analysis (SNA), researchers unpacking corrupt relational actors in natural resources, especially in oil and gas and forestry in Indonesia. We collected six important findings;  corruption creates dependencies amongst actors; to be corrupt, an actor must have a strong network and resources that can offer and deliver multi-interests. Corrupt action is a repeated action that creates interlocking relations amongst actors. Interlocking relation serves as a safety belt for each chauffeur. Institutionalisation of corrupt networks only requires a strong corrupt network. The institutionalised corrupt networks shape a shortcut both for the private and public sectors-a short cut that makes bribery and exchange permits possible.

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