This is an up-to-date and integrated introduction to model theory, designed to be used for graduate courses (for students who are familiar with first-order logic), and as a reference for more experienced logicians and mathematicians. Model theory is concerned with the notions of definition, interpretation and structure in a very general setting, and is applied to a wide variety of other areas such as set theory, geometry, algebra (in particular group theory), and computer science (e.g. logic programming and specification). Professor Hodges emphasises definability and methods of construction, and introduces the reader to advanced topics such as stability. He also provides the reader with much historical information and a full bibliography, enhancing the book's use as a reference.

We describe a logic which is the same as first-order logic except that it allows control over the information that passes down from formulas to subformulas. For example the logic is adequate to express branching quantifiers. We describe a compositional semantics for this logic; in particular this gives a compositional meaning to formulas of the 'information-friendly' language of Hintikka and Sandu. For first-order formulas the semantics reduces to Tarski's semantics for first-order logic. We prove that two formulas have the same interpretation in all structures if and only if replacing an occurrence of one by an occurrence of the other in a sentence never alters the truth-value of the sentence in any structure. 1

We give a criterion involving existence of many generic sequences of automorphisms for a countable structure to have the small index property. We use it to show that (i) any ω-stable ω-categorical structure, and (ii) the random graph has the small index property. We also show that the automorphism group of such a structure is not the union of a countable chain of proper subgroups.

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We can use the compositional semantics of Hodges [9] to show that any compositional semantics for logics of imperfect information must obey certain constraints on the number of semantically inequivalent formulas. As a corollary, there is no compositional semantics for the ‘independence-friendly’ logic of Hintikka and Sandu (henceforth IF) in which the interpretation in a structure A of each 1 -ary formula is a subset of the domain of A (Corollary 6.2 below proves this and more). After a fashion, this rescues a claim of Hintikka and provides the proof which he lacked:… there is no realistic hope of formulating compositional truth-conditions for [sentences of IF], even though I have not given a strict impossibility proof to that effect.(Hintikka [6] page 110ff.) One curious spinoff is that there is a structure of cardinality 6 on which the logic of Hintikka and Sandu gives nearly eight million inequivalent formulas in one free variable (which is more than the population of Finland).We thank the referee for a sensible change of notation, and Joel Berman and Stan Burris for bringing us up to date with the computation of Dedekind's function (see section 4). Our own calculations, utterly trivial by comparison, were done with Maple V.The paper Hodges [9] (cf. [10]) gave a compositional semantics for a language with some devices of imperfect information. The language was complicated, because it allowed imperfect information both at quantifiers and at conjunctions and disjunctions.