This paper addresses the following unresolved questions from the perspective of ambiguity theory: Why do some firms issue equity instead of debt? Why did most firms retain their cash holdings instead of distributing them as dividends in recent times? How do firms change their financing policies during a period of severe financial constraints and ambiguity, or when facing the threat of an unpredictable financial crisis? We analyze how the values of the firm's equity and debt are affected by ambiguity. We also show that cash holdings are retained longer if the investors' ambiguity aversion bias is sufficiently large, while cash holdings become less attractive when the combined impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is relatively low.

Abstract. This paper integrates ambiguity into a contingent claim model for convertible debt. We study how convertible debt valuation is affected by the ambiguity biases of equity holders and debt holders and provide sensitivity analysis of the bond value to changes in attitude toward ambiguity, firm and bond parameters. Our results, which are summarized into six main predictions, are consistent with recent empirical evidence and offer a possible interpretation of some corporate finance puzzles.

For an economy with dysfunctional intertemporal financial markets the financial sector is modelled as a competitive banking sector offering deposit contracts. In a setting related to Allen and Gale (JoF, 1998) properties of the optimal liquidity provision are analyzed for illiquid assets with ambiguous returns.In the context of our model, ambiguity -- i.e. incalculable risk -- leads to dynamically inconsistent investor behaviour. If the financial sector fails to recognize the presence of ambiguity, unanticipated fundamental crises may occur, which are incorrectly blamed on investors 'loosing their nerves' and 'panicing'.The basic mechanism of the Financial Crisis resembles the liquidation of illiquid assets during a banking panic. The combination of providing additional liquidity and supporting distressed financial institutions implements the regulatory policy suggested by the model.A credible commitment to such 'bail-out policy' does not create a moral hazard problem. Rather, it implements the second best efficient outcome by discouraging excessive caution. Reducing ambiguity by increasing stability, transparency and predictability -- as suggested by ordo-liberalism and the 'Freiburger Schule' -- enhances ex-ante welfare.

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