Objective. The objective of this article is to examine the impact of Indian gaming on reservation conditions in the contiguous American states following passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. Methods. Utilizing 1990 and 2000 Census data for 330 Indian nations, a pretest/posttest design permits a comparison of nongaming nations to three different types of gaming nations on eight economic measures, while controlling for multiple tribal characteristics and considering the effects of certain state contextual factors confronting nations due to location. Results. The analysis reveals (1) that the overall impact of gaming, while generally positive, is not as extensive after controlling for certain tribal features, (2) that there are differential effects evident across the three types of gaming nations, and (3) that the state context makes a difference in influencing the relationship between gaming and reservation conditions. The most substantial impacts are for a small subset of nations with Class III gaming and making per capita payments to their members in larger, wealthier states prohibiting non-Indian casinos. Conclusion. These results challenge some of the core assumptions about Indian gaming radically changing the poor economic conditions endemic to Indian country

In the last two decades, federal judges in virtually all states have ordered state governments to alter dramatically the way they operate such institutions as prisons, hospitals, and mental health facilities. The research presented here seeks to improve our understanding of the budgetary linkage between the federal judiciary and state governments by examining the influence of court-ordered prison reform on state expenditures for corrections. Generally, the results indicate that the judiciary has had a limited but positive impact on capital outlays in one-half of the states examined. The influence on state operating expenditures for corrections has been even less noticeable. The analysis suggests that the judiciary's ability to exercise “the power of the purse” is tempered by the dynamics of state-level budgetary processes and the willingness of courts to adopt a comprehensive view of prison reform.The judiciary & has no influence over either the sword or the purse.—Alexander HamiltonA state is not at liberty to afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit comfortably within its budget.—U.S. District JudgeFrank M. Johnson, Jr.

This study examines the economic and social impact of Indian gaming on the residents of the 22 pueblos and tribes in New Mexico. Copyright (c) 2009 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

Questions about the relation of court caseloads to plea bargaining practices generate much controversy but little sophisticated empirical research. Here we examine the effects of a 1975 felony plea bargaining ban in the Texas district courts in El Paso. Relying on a quasi-experimental interrupted time series model with annual data for 1968–83, we test the hypothesis that the discontinuance of plea bargaining negatively affects court caseloads, specifically the proportion of cases going to jury trial and the disposition rate. We also examine conviction rate, exploring whether the existence of plea bargaining encourages prosecutors to accept weak cases. We find a considerable increase in the proportion of cases going to jury trial immediately after the ban's implementation and a substantial but gradual decrease in the disposition rate. The jury trial rate contributed substantially to the disposition rate decline. The conviction rate was generally unaffected by the ban, although it became more consistent after the ban. Overall our findings suggest that the ban on explicit plea bargaining did affect the district courts' ability to move the felony docket efficiently.

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