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Minimum parking requirements are the norm for urban and suburban development in the United States (Davidson and Dolnick (2002)). The justification for parking space requirements is that overflow parking will occupy nearby street or off-street parking. and Willson (1995) provides cases where there is reason to believe that parking space requirements have forced parcel developers to place more parking than they would in the absence of parking requirements. If the effect of parking minimums is to significantly increase the land area devoted to parking, then the increase in impervious surfaces would likely cause water quality degradation, increased flooding, and decreased groundwater recharge. However, to our knowledge the existing literature does not test the effect of parking minimums on the amount of lot space devoted to parking beyond a few case studies. This paper tests the hypothesis that parking space requirements cause an oversupply of parking by examining the implicit marginal value of land allocated to parking spaces. This is an indirect test of the effects of parking requirements that is similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2003). A simple theoretical model shows that the marginal value of additional parking to the sale price should be equal to the cost of land plus the cost of parking construction. We estimate the marginal values of parking and lot area with spatial methods using a large data set from the Los Angeles area nonresidential property sales and find that for most of the property types the marginal value of parking is significantly below that of the parcel area. This evidence supports the contention that minimum parking requirements significantly increase the amount of parcel area devoted to parking.

[1] Urban storm water runoff is both a source of pollution and a potentially valuable resource. Centralized facilities traditionally have been used to manage runoff. Decentralized best management practice (BMP) options may be able to avoid the costs of purchasing expensive urban land needed for centralized facilities. We investigate the cost effectiveness of implementing BMPs in a Los Angeles area watershed with two voluntary incentive mechanisms: competitive bidding and a fixed subsidy. The subsidy mechanism has lower BMP placement costs but generates relatively large excess profits for landowners. The bidding mechanism has higher BMP placement costs but generates smaller excess profits and tends to be more cost effective for the regulator, particularly at higher runoff capture levels. We also compare the costs of bidding and centralized alternatives and find that the bidding alternative is significantly less costly than a centralized alternative for a range of storm water capture goals. Finally, we examine the value of infiltrated storm water and find that it is up to 38% of total BMP costs.

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