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Widespread collective bargaining in the United States originated with the National War Labor Board of 1918. Later legislation made participation mandatory for employers. Since 1935 government intervention in collective bargaining has been continued by each administration to carry out its national purposes. The real choice appears to be among alternate degrees and forms of government regulation, not between laissez faire and regulation. Measured by the criterion of industrial peace alone, comparatively unregulated collective bargaining has functioned effectively. Strike activity has declined over the past three decades both in time lost and in workers involved. The contribution of government intervention to such industrial peace is not clear. Intervention experiences have been varied and somewhat contradictory. It may be necessary, however, to be able to invoke government intervention in certain emergency disputes. It appears desirable to change the labor disputes section of the Taft-Hartley LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 from the current rigidity of action to an elastic choice-of-procedures approach. Unregulated collective bargaining has not functioned effectively in safeguarding internal democracy within unions, in checking excessive and illegal use of power, and in the promotion of full employment. Legislative change is necessary to meet some of the specific problems in each of these three areas.

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