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We explore whether investors’ perceptions of pro forma earnings numbers have changed following the regulation of pro forma reporting imposed by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). First, we find that investors appear to pay more attention to pro forma earnings disclosures in the post‐SOX period, consistent with the notion that they perceive that regulation generally renders these disclosures more credible. Second, the results indicate that investors discount aggressive pro forma earnings reports in both periods. However, they appear to discount at least some potentially misleading pro forma earnings disclosures more in the post‐SOX period. Finally, our results imply that the regulation of pro forma reporting has increased the average quality of pro forma earnings disclosures by filtering out those that are most likely to be misleading. These results are consistent with the conclusions that (1) the quality of pro forma reporting has improved following SOX, and (2) investors’ perceptions of pro forma earnings metrics have changed in the post‐SOX regulatory environment.

Concern that earnings management erodes the quality of financial reporting has prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to question the role of the external auditor. To help address that concern, this study examines the relation between earnings management and auditor litigation. While prior research on the relation between auditor litigation and total accruals has yielded inconclusive results, I find that the risk of auditor litigation is positively associated with a sharper measure of earnings management—abnormal accruals. Using a larger and more recent sample, this study provides evidence that the probability of auditor litigation increases as clients report more positive (income-increasing) abnormal accruals. This result holds in: (1) univariate analyses, (2) logit analyses that also control for auditor size, client importance to the auditor, length of the auditor-client relationship, client industry, client financial condition, client size, and client growth, and in (3) the subsample of lawsuits alleging wrongdoing in the more recent time period (1984–1998).

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