When should nudging be deemed as permissible and when should it be deemed as intrusive to individuals' freedom of choice? Should all types of nudges be judged the same? To date the debate concerning these issues has largely proceeded without much input from the general public. The main objective of this study is to elicit public views on the use of nudges in policy. In particular we investigate attitudes toward two broad categories of nudges that we label pro-self (i.e. focusing on private welfare) and pro-social (i.e. focusing on social welfare) nudges. In addition we explore how individual differences in thinking and feeling influence attitudes toward nudges. General population samples in Sweden and the United States (n= 952) were presented with vignettes describing nudge-policies and rated acceptability and intrusiveness on freedom of choice. To test for individual differences, measures on cultural cognition and analytical thinking were included. The results show that attitudes toward nudge-policies were more positive in Sweden than United States, but the level of stated support was generally high in both countries. Somewhat paradoxically a majority of the respondents perceived the presented nudge interventions as intrusive to freedom of choice. Nudge-polices classified as pro-social had a significantly lower acceptance rate compared to pro-self nudges (p<.0001). Individuals with a more individualistic worldview were less likely to perceive nudges as acceptable, while individuals more prone to analytical thinking were less likely to perceive nudges as intrusive to freedom of choice. To conclude, our findings suggest that the notion of "one-nudge-fits-all" is not tenable. Recognizing this is an important aspect both for successfully implementing nudges as well as nuancing nudge theory.

Nudges are increasingly being proposed and used as a policy tool around the world. The success of nudges depends on public acceptance. However, several questions about what makes a nudge acceptable remain unanswered. In this paper, we examine whether policy alternatives to nudges influence the public's acceptance of these nudges: Do attitudes change when the nudge is presented alongside either a more paternalistic policy alternative (legislation) or a less paternalistic alternative (no behavioral intervention)? In two separate samples drawn from the Swedish general public, we find a very small effect of alternatives on the acceptability of various default nudges overall. Surprisingly, we find that when the alternative to the nudge is legislation, acceptance decreases and perceived intrusiveness increases (relative to conditions where the alternative is no regulation). An implication of this finding is that acceptance of nudges may not always automatically increase when nudges are explicitly compared to more paternalistic alternatives.

We use skin conductance to measure emotional arousal in subjects who make risky choices under time pressure or time delay. Our results show a strong correlation between subjects' skin conductance responses and their risky choices under time pressure but not under time delay. Subjects were more risk taking for higher levels of measured electrodermal activity (skin conductance). In line with descriptive theories of risky choice, the effect was most pronounced for choices involving losses rather than gains. Taken together, our findings indicate that participants under time pressure rely on affect at the point of decision-making. This provides support for behavioral models that recognize the role of emotional brain systems in decision making under risk.

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Partisan bias for acceptability of nudges in Sweden: When partisanconsistent legislation is as good as partisan-inconsistent nudges. Manuscript.