Abstract. This paper describes the new global long-term, International Satellite Cloud Climatology Project (ISCCP) H-Series climate data record (CDR). The H-Series data contains a suite of level 2 and level 3 products for monitoring the distribution and variation of cloud and surface properties to better understand the effects of clouds on climate, the radiation budget, and the global hydrologic cycle. This product is currently available for public use and is derived from both geostationary and polar orbiting satellite imaging radiometers with common visible and infrared (IR) channels. The H-Series data spans from July 1983 to Dec 2009 with plans for continued production to extend the record to the present with regular updates. The H-series data are the longest combined geostationary and polar orbiter satellite based CDR of cloud properties. Access to the data is provided in network Common Data Form (netCDF) and archived by NOAA's National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) under the satellite Climate Data Record Program (https://doi.org/10.7289/V5QZ281S). The basic characteristics, history, and evolution of the dataset are presented herein with particular emphasis on and discussion of product changes between the H-Series and the widely used predecessor D-Series product which spans from July 1983 through December 2009. Key refinements included to the ISCCP H-Series CDR are based on improved quality control measures, modified ancillary inputs, higher spatial resolution input and output products, calibration refinements, and updated documentation and metadata to bring the H-Series product into compliance with existing standards for climate data records.

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I estimate the impact of Nebraska’s 1937 switch from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature on state-level government expenditures. Using the synthetic control method I create a counterfactual Nebraska from a weighted average of other potential control states and compare spending in this “synthetic Nebraska” to spending in the real Nebraska. Relative to the synthetic control, Nebraska experiences a sharp decrease in expenditures per capita immediately following the switch to a unicameral legislature; however, the difference appears to diminish over time. Placebo tests show that if the change in Nebraska’s legislative structure were randomly assigned among the sample of states, and legislative structure had no real impact on spending, the likelihood of obtaining a treatment-effect estimate as large as Nebraska’s would be 0.0213. While the initial drop in expenditures per capita lends support to the theory that bicameralism, by requiring more veto players, is associated with higher levels of government spending, the fact that the difference between Nebraska and synthetic Nebraska diminishes suggests that legislators are able to circumvent this constraint.

Using a quarterly panel of U.S. corporations over the period 1985-2014, we show that corporate managers respond to political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty shocks in different ways. We proxy for political uncertainty using the Partisan Conflict Index and employ a prevalent empirical macroeconomic methodology to construct structural shocks that are orthogonal to shocks captured by the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. Following a political uncertainty shock, corporations increase cash but do not adjust investment. Alternatively, following an economic policy uncertainty shock, firms appear to draw on cash and reduce capital spending to increase research and development spending.

Using a panel of US states over the period 1985–2010, we examine how Democratic governors affect economic freedom compared to Republican governors. Economic freedom is measured using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. Given the emphasis that this index places on smaller government, we expect that having a Democratic governor leads to less economic freedom. However, using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that Democratic governors do not reduce economic freedom compared to Republican governors elected by a similar margin. An implication of this result is that governors must appeal to the median voter when making policy.