Thirty pictures, rated on 22 scales, were shown to 34 males, while pupillary diameters and heart rates were recorded, to test the prediction that attention to the environment leads to sympathetic‐like dilatation and parasympathetic‐like cardiac slowing, and to study the relationships of the responses to stimulus‐attributes. The prediction was satisfied, demonstrating directional fractionation and situational stereotypy. Tonic levels changed significantly during the experiment and also showed directional fractionation. A few individuals and stimuli, however, yielded reliable pupillary constriction, demonstrating intra‐stressor stereotypy. Four factors characterized the ratings, two of which were associated with the autonomic responses. Pupillary dilatation and cardiac slowing increased as the Attention‐Interest value increased. Pupillary dilatation was greatest to pictures midway on the Pleasantness‐Evaluation factor, and greater to unpleasant than to pleasant stimuli. Cardiac slowing was linearly related to pleasantness, with unpleasant stimuli provoking the greatest slowing. The two responses were correlated less than measurement reliability would have allowed, demonstrating quantitative dissociation. When base‐corrected scores were used the correlations again were low and highly variable among subjects and stimuli, even in direction.

The effects of three personality needs, nurturance, intraception, and abasement, of 35 males and 35 females on their ocular responses during a structured interview by a female interviewer were studied. The interviewee's responses to each of 48 questions were scored as (a) maintenance of eye contact throughout verbal responses, (6) break of eye contact before end of question, (c) lateral gaze aversion, and (d) vertical gaze aversion. Subjects high in need abasement looked away markedly more often to the left than persons low on the need. Also, subjects high in nurturance maintained eye contact more than low-nurturance subjects. Evidently, the face "leaks" information regarding the personality. Findings were related to work of Ekman, Tomkins, Bakan, and others.

According to Adams' equity model, members of a dyad whose work inputs are equal endeavor to divide their joint reward equally. If one member, who was responsible for dividing the reward, chose to give the other member more than half or less than half, the other member would experience inequity. When given an opportunity to divide a second reward, the other member's division was expected to compensate the initial inequity. However, if the other member was over-or underrewarded by chance, he was expected to ignore the initial reward and compute equity on the basis of the second reward alone, thus dividing the second reward about equally. Results, based upon 72 ninthgrade students, confirmed the predictions and suggest that outcomes intentionally produced by relevant others are included in the computation of equity, while unintentional outcomes are ignored.

First and fifth graders worked together with a fictitious partner to earn a joint reward of 100. Work inputs were equal, but the subject's share of the reward, distributed by his partner and either given intentionally or determined by chance, was either 70 or 30. Subjects' allocations of a second 100 reward revealed a very different pattern from that of ninth graders. The older subjects' allocations had been interpreted in terms of Adams's equity theory, that is, subjects taking intentionally distributed, but not chance-determined, first rewards into account in balancing inputs and outcomes. The present younger subjects disregarded their partners' intentions. Overrewarded subjects consistently returned about 50, seeming to use a norm of equality; underrewarded subjects consistently returned about 30, seeming to employ a norm of retaliatory reciprocity.

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