Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and how cooperation might be restored. Noncooperative game theory raises serious doubts about the possibilities, although interactional justice and impression management research have shown that verbal explanations can dampen reactions to aversive behavior. Philosophical, anthropological, and ethological research all suggest that genuine forgiveness may require something more tangible and substantive than an explanation. Thus, the current experiment investigated the effects of explanations and varying forms of substantive amends on the restoration of mutual cooperation. The results confirm that rebuilding cooperation is feasible. Apologies and simple explanations can be effective to a degree, though substantive amends have significantly more positive effects than explanations alone. In contrast to prior findings on interactional justice, acknowledgments were more effective than denials in repairing short interactions. This research demonstrates that, once breached, cooperation can be reestablished and that actions as well as explanations and apologies can augment the process in important and sometimes subtle ways.

The present study assessed cross-cultural differences in the perception of financial risks. Students at large universities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and the U.S., as well as a group of Taiwanese security analysts rated the riskiness of a set of monetary lotteries. Risk judgments differed with nationality, but not with occupation (students vs. security analysts) and were modeled by the Conjoint Expected Risk (CER) model?') Consistent with cultural differences in country uncertainty avoidance,(2) CER model parameters of respondents from the two Western countries differed from those of respondents from the two countries with Chinese cultural roots: The risk judgments of respondents from Hong Kong and Taiwan were more sensitive to the magnitude of potential losses and less mitigated by the probability of positive outcomes.

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This paper examines contracting between a principal and an agent from the perspective of both social exchange theory and rational choice theory. Two experiments were conducted that tested competing predictions from the two theories. The first study examined effort decisions made by an agent under a series of contracts that varied in social context and compensation structure. The second experiment examined the negotiation of a compensation scheme between a principal and an agent and the agent's subsequent contract fulfillment, to test the mediating effects of verbal communication between parties on contracting and contract fulfillment. Both studies yielded results consistent with social exchange theory. Exchange theory appears to provide a better basis for deriving principles of organization design than rational choice.

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