This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This paper explains the continuing success of European cooperative banks through evolving comparative advantages. It points out that a cooperative is built around an intergenerational endowment without final owners, which creates particular governance challenges. Risks include the use of the endowment for purposes other than members' best interest, such as empire-building, and attempts at appropriation. The risk of empire-building is reinforced by mechanisms that foster capital accumulation and asymmetric opportunities for consolidation. The paper concludes that some form of independent external oversight of corporate governance is warranted and that cooperatives need mechanisms enabling them to better manage their capital.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.

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for doing so much to make our joint conference a success; and to the presenters and participants in our conference for their valuable intellectual contributions.This book benefited from the constructive and frank discussions on financial integration that the authors and members of the IMF's EU Policies team have had in recent years with staff at the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission and with many other experts in Europe. Without implicating anyone and with inevitable risks of omission, we would like to extend special thanks to