SINCE the foundation of the Gifford Lectures, philosophies of religion have poured in upon us in a constant stream. With one or two exceptions, they have been marked by a strong family resemblance. The interpretation of religion has proceeded in the main on intellectualistic lines.It is true that the rationalism of the eighteenth century-of Locke, Toland, Tindal, and Kanthas been left behind. The attempt is no longer made to evolve religion from the reason of the individual. In this, as in other departments of thought, the significance of history has been learned ; and for the subjective reason of the individual there has been substituted the objective reason in the great historical life of humanity. It is recognised that a man's religion is not the product of his isolated thought, but that it comes to him as an inheritance from a past in which the universal mind, in contact with fact, has been slowly working out a solution of the world-problem, and building up an interpretation of human life. No one will dispute the reality and importance of the advance thus made. From the modern standpoint the historical religions can be understood and appreciated in a way that was not possible while they were regarded as made up of a few simple, self-evident truths overlaid with a mass of superstition. But, notwithstanding this gain, it is questionable whether the modern speculative theisms bring us appreciably closer to the real religious forces and motives than the old rationalism. If the ground of rationalism has been widened, it has not been abandoned. No other method of reaching truth is recognised than the speculative method; no other kind of certainty than that which belongs to the most satisfactory hypothesis. The doctrines of religion are developed in complete independence of Christ ; Revelation and Faith are reduced to the terms of reason. One might easily carry away the impression that Jesus and the prophets are of less importance for our knowledge of God than Plato, Kant, and Hegel.

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MR. GARvIE has brought to the by no means easy task of expounding Ritschlian Theology not only keen insight and wide accurate scholarship, but also what is not less necessary, and even more rare, an open mind. He is always willing to go behind traditional dogma to the facts of revelation or experience which dogma expresses or interprets, and to entertain the question whether such facts have been presented in their purity and completeness.The result of his careful and eminently sympathetic study is a work, which for clearness, fulness, and fidelity to the sources leaves little to be desired. While intended, in the first place, for those unacquainted with German, it will prove a valuable and indeed indispensable guide to the student of German who aspires to master the original literature of what is beyond all question the most significant theological movement since the days of Schleiermacher.Mr. Garvie has not been sparing in criticism ; and yet what strikes the reader is not so much the points in which he differs from Ritschl, as the very wide agreement both in method and results.He frankly concedes the Ritschlian contention that traditional dogma contains elements derived from a temporary metaphysic, that metaphysical ideas often obscure historical facts, and that there is need for a new dogmatic construction. With Ritschl he rejects the Scholastic method of manipulating formulas, whether the material be derived from ecclesiastical findings or from the New Testament writings. He rejects the claim of Mysticism to a knowledge of God or of the Risen Christ, that is not mediated by historical Revelation. And, finally, he refuses to accept the traditional Christology, with its reductio ad absurdum, the Kenotic theory; and concedes that we must begin, not with a presupposed Divine nature as omniscient and omnipotent, but with Christ's historical life and work.Mr. Garvie's criticism concentrates in the main round two points, and as these relate to Ritschl's metJrod, his objections necessarily extend to many of the particular doctrines in Ritschl's system. To take first the objection which receives the lesser prominence, though it may not be the less important, he thinks that Ritschlians have not attached sufficient weight to the apostolic writings as an authoritative interpretation of Christian facts.