This study examines the effect of the country of origin of the vaccine on vaccination acceptance against COVID-19. More specifically, we show how the political context in Brazil has affected acceptance of vaccines produced in China, Russia, the US, and England at the University of Oxford. Our data come from a survey experiment applied to a national sample of 2771 adult Brazilians between September 23 and October 2, 2020. We find greater rejection among Brazilians for vaccines developed in China and Russia, as compared to vaccines from the US or England. We also find that rejection of the Chinese-developed vaccine is particularly strong among those who support President Jair Bolsonaro—a COVID-19 denier and strong critic of China and vaccination, in general.

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The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a vast research agenda focusing on how citizens acquire knowledge about the virus and the health expert guidelines to protect themselves and their close ones against it. While many countries and regions have been accounted for, there still remains a substantial gap with respect to public opinion about the virus in Latin America, most notably in Brazil, which currently has the second highest in number of fatalities in the world. In this article, we employ a national survey of Brazilians (n = 2,771) to measure and explain knowledge and misinformation about the coronavirus and its illness, COVID-19. Our focus concerns the role of political preferences in a context of high elite polarization with a sitting government that has systematically downplayed the risks associated with the coronavirus and its illness. Our findings are clear: political preferences play a substantial role in explaining differences in knowledge about the coronavirus and COVID-19, more than conventional determinants of learning like motivation, ability, and opportunities. Specifically, we find that supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro—an avid science and COVID-19 denier—know significantly less about the coronavirus and its illness and are more likely to believe in a conspiracy theory that claims that the coronavirus was purposefully created in a Chinese laboratory to promote China's economic power, when compared to Brazilians who are less supportive of him and his government. Our findings carry important implications for how Brazilians take informational cues from political elites in that—even in a major event like a global pandemic—supporters of the president are as likely as ever to “follow their leader” and deny expert-backed scientific evidence.

R R R Resumo: esumo: esumo: esumo: Este artigo analisa 156 pesquisas pré-eleitorais realizadas em 2010 nas disputas para Presidente e para os 27 governadores com o objetivo de descrever e explicar suas discrepâncias em relação aos resultados apurados nas urnas. O balanço utiliza o Método Mosteller 3 (MM3) para o cálculo do acerto agregado de cada pesquisa pré-eleitoral e sugere o Método de Estimação do Erro para cada Candidato (MEEC), com o propósito de investigar a existência de viés contra partido ou conjunto de partidos naquelas eleições. Os resultados revelam erros superiores às margens informadas à Justiça Eleitoral, mas não permitem condenar a precisão e a neutralidade partidária do conjunto das pesquisas analisadas. Maiores discrepâncias foram encontradas: i) em pesquisas realizadas com maior antecedência, ii) quando ainda no 1º turno, iii) em disputas pouco competitivas, (iv) quando havia poucos candidatos e v) nas eleições de governadores. Palavras Palavras Palavras Palavras----chave chave chave chave: eleições 2010; surveys pré-eleitorais; metodologia; erro A A A Abstract: bstract: bstract: bstract: This article analyzes 156 pre-election surveys conducted in 2010 on candidates for President and Governor in the 27 Brazilian Federal Units. The main objective is to describe and explain differences between survey and ballot results. The study uses Mosteller's Method 3 (MM3) to calculate the overall accuracy of each pre-election survey and suggests the Candidate Error Estimation Method (MEEC) to investigate a possible bias against a party or a group of parties during that election. The resultsshow errors greater than that informed to Brazilian electoral authorities but do not justify calling into question the accuracy or partisan neutrality of the whole set of surveys analyzed. Greater differences were found: i) in surveys conducted many days before the vote, ii) during the first round, iii) in low competitive races, iv) when there were few candidates and v) in elections forGovernor.

In this paper we bring together institutional, contextual, and behavioral perspectives in a comprehensive model that explores determinants of executive and legislative approval based on economic performance in Brazil and Chile. Our main question is, do voters attribute responsibility for the state of the economy to their representatives in the Legislative Branch as they apparently do to officeholders in the Executive Branch? We search for answers to this question with an eye on how active the distinct branches of government are in economic policy-making and voters' levels of political sophistication. Our main hypothesis is that less sophisticated voters will blame politicians indiscriminately for the state of the economy, independent of how influential each branch of government is on economic policy. More sophisticated voters will better discern the role each branch plays in economic policymaking and will not blame representatives in the Legislative Branch for the state of the economy when Congress is not active in economic policy-making. The cases of Brazil and Chile under Cardoso and Lagos offer the perfect opportunity to test this hypothesis, which is confirmed by our data.