No abstract

This study examines the associations between the provision of tax services by incumbent auditors and earnings management. We investigate whether three different effects of tax service provision play different roles in accounting practices. The three effects include the audit independence effect, the knowledge spillover effect, and the tax avoidance effect. If the provision of tax services by incumbent auditors harms auditor independence, firms may exercise greater earnings management (audit independence effect). However, if incumbent auditors gain incremental knowledge by offering tax services, the quality of their audit services could be enhanced, and therefore, reported earnings could be more conservative (knowledge spillover effect). If tax service fee leads to low taxable income, it could depress book income when book-tax conformity is high (tax avoidance effect). We find that the provision of tax services generally improves earnings quality by curtailing opportunistic accounting practices. The results also suggest that the negative association between the provision of tax services and discretionary accruals seems to be primarily driven by the knowledge spillover effect as opposed to the tax avoidance effect. Additional analysis is conducted in examining whether the tax avoidance effect exists in a sub-sample.

Purpose This study aims to verify the circumstances under which managing the allowance for uncollectible accounts is used as a tool of earnings management. Design/methodology/approach The authors investigate whether bad debt expense, which is an income statement counterpart of allowance for uncollectible accounts, is adjusted downward when pre-managed earnings is slightly above zero earnings, prior year’s earnings or analysts’ forecasts. Findings The findings of this study show that firms manage bad debt expense downward to avoid losses, sustain the prior year’s earnings and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. The authors also find that the understatement of bad debt expense to meet earnings benchmarks is pronounced for firms with high tax costs. Social implications Standard setters and auditors can gain a better understanding in detail of the practices and methods of managing earnings via the allowance for uncollectible accounts. Originality/value This study is the first to examine earnings management via the allowance for uncollectible accounts in non-financial Korean firms. In addition, the findings provide the evidence that firms prefer to use the allowance for uncollectible accounts as a strategic tool to meet benchmarks, especially when their tax costs are high.

Changes in the statutory corporate income tax rate provide firms with an opportunity to reduce their tax burden by shifting their taxable income from higher to lower tax rate years. One negative consequence of shifting taxable income across years is higher variation in book income for financial reporting purposes. Taxable income and book income are closely related in most countries, and, in general, reporting volatile book income across years is not a favorable signal to investors. This study investigates how firms shift taxable income and concurrently mitigate book income fluctuation by managing accrual components separately when the statutory income tax rate changes. Unlike prior studies, we decompose discretionary accruals into two components and examine distinctive patterns of accrual management in Korea, where book-tax conformity is high and aggressive tax avoidance is restricted. We find that firms manage book-tax accruals for taxable income shifting and manage book-only accruals to mitigate book income fluctuation. Furthermore, we find the extent of book-tax and book-only accruals management varies depending on the firms tax and financial reporting costs. The results of this study provide clear and compelling evidence of firms opportunistic accrual management behavior in response to statutory tax rate reduction.

This study examines the effectiveness of accounting conservatism in monitoring and controlling managers’ decision-making regarding opportunistic investment. We find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with over-investment. This suggests that conservative accounting policies serve as an efficient monitoring and controlling mechanism for opportunistic investment decisions. We also find a stronger negative association between accounting conservatism and over-investment in firms with low managerial ownership and low ownership by foreign investors. The results of our analysis imply that the impact of timely loss recognition on over-investment is more significant in firms with high agency problems and weaker monitoring ability, and that this factor complements other governance mechanisms, thereby helping to control managers’ myopic investment decisions. We provide evidence for a role of financial disclosure in mitigating managers’ opportunistic over-investment decisions. Though managers’ over-investment decisions are motivated by private gain, which reduces firm performance and compromises investors’ welfare, limited research exists on the role of financial information in alleviating such behavior. We suggest that timely loss recognition in financial statements can serve as an effective monitoring mechanism to aid in control of managers’ myopic over-investment.