No abstract

No abstract

Does the rise of China inexorably anticipate the onset of global instability or even a great power war? Today, routine comparisons are made between a rising China with that of Germany over 100 years ago. Organski, in his original explication of power transition theory, however, was far more cautious. Despite predicting the remarkable rise of China nearly 60 years ago in his book (1958), World Politics, Organski was circumspect in predicting a great power war involving China and the United States. This article examines the development of power transition theory by a variety of scholars since Organski. We draw on these developments of power transition theory to analyze the implications of the rise of China. We also introduce the other articles that compose this Special Issue of International Area Studies Review on power transition theory and the rise of China.

Original power transition theory is extended by relaxing the restrictive assumption of the method of augmenting national power. The occurrence of war in East Asia from 1860 to 1993 is examined to see if the revised power transition argument holds for the conflicts in East Asia. Results show that conflicts in East Asia occur under the same general conditions that lead to war in the international system and that war is most likely when the dissatisfied challenger approximates the dominant power. The evidence also suggests that the role of alliances is crucial for mitigating or militating the risk of war, contrary to the standard power transition formulation. Because alliances play a central role in the risk of wars, the dangers of such a conflict in East Asia (or elsewhere) can be managed through skillful strategies of alignment and de-alignment.