The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has provided a peaceful framework for governing the continent over many decades, in spite of seven extant territorial claims. However, its method of freezing these claims has been criticised for being short-sighted and ineffective in providing a long-term solution. This paper argues to the contrary. It undertakes a brisk analysis of different categories of alternatives: global commons, absolute sovereignty, restricted sovereignty and shared sovereignty. After dismissing each category for various reasons, it promotes the reform of the existing ATS, in which a long-term vision and modified chairmanship structure provide stronger leadership and more effective implementation. Essentially, it holds that the primary reason there is criticism of the system is because it is not functioning as well as it might be. The paper not only contends that a developed ATS is an achievable aim, but that it could eventually develop into a restricted, shared sovereignty governance framework. That form of governance, which would emerge over time, could be a more durable solution that resolves the competing territorial claims. In this way, the paper charts a potential pathway for the future of Antarctic governance. This path begins, however, with a reformed ATS.