This article investigates the influence of environmental policy (EP) on growth in an AK-type growth model, when finite lifetime is introduced and the link between pollution and life expectancy (through the detrimental impact of pollution on health) is taken into account.Using an overlapping generations modelà la Blanchard (1985), we demonstrate that finite lifetime introduces a "generational turnover effect" which modifies the influence of the EP on growth. Thus, when lifetime is finite and independent from pollution, we show that the "generational turnover effect" limits the detrimental impact of the EP on growth, if agents smooth their consumption over time. When pollution negatively influences life expectancy through health, we demonstrate that the "generational turnover effect" is magnified and that the relation between the EP and growth is reversed U-shaped in the steady-state. In this case, we show that the environmental policy is more likely to promote growth (i.e. it stimulates growth for a wider range of environmental taxes) when the impact of pollution on health is important and/or public expenditures in health is low. Finally, using numerical simulations, we find that for the value of parameters chosen the EP will be more likely to promote growth when agents smooth consumption over time.

SummaryUsing an overlapping generation model à la Blanchard (1985) with human capital accumulation, this article demonstrates that the influence of environment on optimal growth in the long-run may be explained by the detrimental effect of pollution on life expectancy. It also shows that, in such a case, greener preferences are growth-and welfare-improving even if the ability of the agents to learn is independent to pollution and utility is additively separable. Finally, it establishes that it is possible to implement a win-win environmental policy.

This article demonstrates that when finite lifetime is introduced in a Lucas (1988) growth model where the source of pollution is physical capital, the environmental policy may enhance the growth rate of a market economy, while pollution does not influence educational activities, labor supply is not elastic and human capital does not enter the utility function. The result arises from the "generational turnover effect" due to finite lifetime. It remains valid under conditions when the education sector uses final output besides time to accumulate human capital. Nevertheless, it does no longer hold when the source of pollution is output.Furthermore, this article demonstrates that ageing reduces the positive influence of the environmental policy when growth is driven by human capital accumulation à la Lucas (1988) and lifetime is finite. It also confirms for finite lifetime the result found by Vellinga (1999) with a single representative agent: environmental care does not influence optimal growth when utility is additive and pollution does not influence the ability of agents to be educated.

SummaryUsing an overlapping generation model à la Blanchard (1985) with human capital accumulation, this article demonstrates that the influence of environment on optimal growth in the long-run may be explained by the detrimental effect of pollution on life expectancy. It also shows that, in such a case, greener preferences are growth-and welfare-improving even if the ability of the agents to learn is independent to pollution and utility is additively separable. Finally, it establishes that it is possible to implement a win-win environmental policy.

In this paper, we demonstrate that, in a two‐period overlapping‐generations model, the relationship between environmental taxation and economic activity (output level and growth) has an inverted‐U shape when we take into account the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the individual decision of each working‐age agent to improve her health. We also demonstrate that the link between environmental tax and lifetime welfare also has an inverted‐U shape, and that a tighter environmental policy might enhance economic activity while reducing steady‐state lifetime welfare. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.