Despite the fact that people make decisions for others as often as they make decisions for themselves, little is known about how decisions for others are different from those made for the self. In two experiments, we investigated the effect of social distance (i.e., making decisions for oneself, a friend, or a stranger) on risk preferences in both gain and loss situations. We found that people were more risk averse in gain situations when they made decisions for themselves than for a stranger (Studies 1 and 2), but were equally risk averse for themselves and their friends (Study 2). However, people were more risk seeking in loss situations when they made decisions for themselves than for their friends as well as for a stranger, and were more risk seeking for their friends than for a stranger (Study 2). Furthermore, the effect of social distance on risk preferences was stronger in loss than in gain situations. Mediation analysis indicated that outcome-induced loss aversion was responsible for effects of social distance on risk preferences. These findings demonstrate that social distance influences risk preferences via perceived loss aversion, which sheds new light on self-other differences in decision making.

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Belief bias is the tendency in syllogistic reasoning to rely on prior beliefs rather than to fully obey logical principles. Few studies have investigated the age effect on belief bias. Although several studies have recently begun to explore this topic, little is known about the psychological mechanisms underlying such an effect. Accordingly, we investigated belief bias in older and young adults and explored the roles of working memory (WM) and need for cognition (NFC) in the relationship between age and reasoning performance. We found that older adults showed a lower accuracy rate compared with young adults when conclusion believability and logical validity were incongruent. However, older adults showed a higher accuracy rate compared with young adults when conclusion believability and logical validity were congruent. The results indicated that in comparison with young adults, prior beliefs hampered logical reasoning more significantly in older adults under incongruent conditions and boosted logical reasoning more significantly under congruent conditions. Moreover, the logic index in older adults was significantly lower than in young adults, and the interaction index of believability and validity in older adults was significantly below zero. Furthermore, NFC mediated the age effect on reasoning performance under the two conditions. By contrast, WM mediated the age effect on reasoning performance only under incongruent conditions and did not act as a mediator under congruent conditions.

Although self–other behavioral differences in decision making under risk have been observed in some contexts, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying such differences. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the cups task, in which participants choose between risky and sure options for themselves and others in gain and loss situations, we found that people were more risk-taking when making decisions for themselves than for others in loss situations but were equally risk-averse in gain situations. Significantly stronger activations were observed in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and anterior insula (AI) when making decisions for the self than for others in loss situations but not in gain situations. Furthermore, the activation in the dmPFC was stronger when people made sure choices for others than for themselves in gain situations but not when they made risky choices, and was both stronger when people made sure and risky choices for themselves than for others in loss situations. These findings suggest that gain–loss situation modulates self–other differences in decision making under risk, and people are highly likely to differentiate the self from others when making decisions in loss situations.

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.