No abstract

We investigate R&D incentive under patent protection with cooperation option. Chowdhury [Economics Letters, 2005, 89(1), [120][121][122][123][124][125][126] claims that patent protection may decrease R&D incentive when the tournament effect (TE) is negative. However, We show that patent protection in the presence of R&D cooperation option always increases R&D incentive. In addition, to increase R&D incentive under patent protection, this cooperation option strictly dominates imitation and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on R&D cost, introduced by Mukherjee [Economics Letters, 2006, 93(2), 196-201].

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractWe analyze the formation of rival leagues and deterrence by incumbent leagues in professional team sports, which is one of the least studied forms of competition in sports. We first survey the economic history of professional sport leagues in North America and develop stylized facts about rival league formation. We then develop a game-theoretical model to explain some of these interesting stylized facts, showing that if the bargaining power of the incumbent league is sufficiently small -i.e., less than a certain cutoff -the incumbent should choose expansion to deter the rival league formation; otherwise, it is optimal for the incumbent league to allow a rival league formation and then merge with it, conditional on rival league success. We further show that the incumbent league may pay players relatively high salaries as an alternative way to deter formation by a rival league.JEL Codes: D42, L12, L83

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractWe examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entry. We show that delayed revelation equilibria exist in which some buyers with sufficiently high valuations place coordinated low early bids, and bid their true valuations just prior to the end of the auction. Compared to the benchmark immediate revelation equilibrium, in which buyers bid their true values immediately after entry, fewer high-value bidders enter on expectation in some delayed revelation equilibria. We show that delayed revelation of buyer values decreases social welfare, but is necessary for bidders to have a strict participation incentive. Computations suggest that the welfare effect of delayed revelation consists primarily of transfer of surplus from the seller to bidders, while efficiency losses are relatively small.

The Volkswagen emissions scandal began in 2015, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that diesel cars produced by Volkswagen from 2009 through 2015 were in violation of emissions standards. We analyse the impact of this announcement on transaction prices for Volkswagen cars on the U.S. eBay Motors. The main focus is on Volkswagen cars other than the 2009-2015 diesel models, namely, vehicles that did not violate EPA standards, allowing us to assess whether the negative shock received by the emissions standards violators spilled over to other Volkswagen models that were in compliance. Our difference-in-differences results show that final bid prices declined after the announcement by 14% for non-violating diesel cars and 9% for non-violating gasoline cars. Our analysis also provides little evidence of considerable changes in the numbers of participating bidders, bidding strategies, numbers of listings, and reserve-price strategies, suggesting that the drops in prices likely resulted from lowered willingness to pay from buyers.