We examine the impact of CEO gender on firm‐level average labor cost. In a sample of U.S. public firms with voluntary labor cost disclosure, we find that firms with female CEOs have significantly lower average labor cost than firms with male CEOs. This effect is robust to the use of propensity score matching approach to alleviate the impact of possible selection bias and endogeneity concerns. The results are stronger in a subsample of firms where CEO turnover introduces CEO gender change. We hypothesize that female CEOs may be more risk averse and tend to pursue less risky corporate policies, leading to a lower equilibrium employee wage. Alternatively, female CEOs may offer higher non‐monetary employee benefits in lieu of monetary compensation. Our empirical results do not support the risk aversion hypothesis, whereas we find robust evidence that firms with female CEOs offer higher non‐monetary employee benefits than firms with male CEOs, especially in human capital‐intensive firms.