Noise pollution poses a significant hazard to humans by disrupting the maintenance of the quiet environment that is thought to promote innovation. In this study, the causal relationship between traffic noise and innovation was explored using four models. First, the panel data model with fixed effects was applied to determine the impact of traffic noise on innovation. Second, the interaction model was used to estimate the health regulatory effect. Third, the regression discontinuity model was used to identify the natural experience of the impact of traffic noise on innovation and further determine the causal effect of the noise threshold. Finally, the difference-in-differences model was used to identify the micro impact of traffic noise on innovation. The results show that from macro and micro perspectives, traffic noise suppresses innovation, and that health has a differential impact on the traffic noise–innovation relationship. In addition, we identified the critical point at which the impact of traffic noise on innovation is favorable owing to the white noise effect, providing a quantitative basis for policy implementation. Our results show that current environmental noise regulations must be re-examined to determine new measures for improving the innovative acoustic environment, promoting innovation, and achieving sustainable economic development.

Environmental performance is becoming increasingly essential for promoting local officials in China; thus, their pursuit of promotion may affect agricultural output. This study spatially matched Chinese local official promotion data, regional agricultural output, river-water-quality-monitoring stations, and riverside enterprise discharge data. Based on the difference-in-difference model, the exogenous impact of the natural experiment based on the promotion of officials is quantified as how the promotion behavior of local officials in pursuit of environmental achievements affects agricultural output. This was examined under the decentralization system of China’s environmental governance. The results show that local officials improve agricultural production by controlling environmental pollution through promotion incentives. However, since the central government can observe the regulatory effect of upstream officials through the readings of water monitoring stations, upstream officials strictly enforce the central environmental regulations due to promotion motivation, while downstream officials do not strictly enforce their counterparts. This can result in differentiated impacts on agriculture in upstream and downstream regions. We also carried out a parallel test, placebo test, and measurement error test for the quasi-natural experiment, and the conclusions derived from the analysis remained robust. Our study has important implications for designing compatible environmental governance contracts and incentive policies for promoting agricultural production.

Environmental performance is increasingly important in promoting officials, whose pursuit of promotions and related behavior may affect the health of residents in their jurisdictions. In this study, we spatially matched Chinese river water quality monitoring station data, enterprise pollution emission data, and resident health data and quantified how Chinese officials pursuing promotions based on environmental performance affected resident health using a regression discontinuity design and difference-in-difference with interaction terms design strategy. The results show that the upstream–downstream disparity of environmental governance and pollutant emissions affects the residents’ health, medical treatment behavior, and medical expenditure. Furthermore, we identified the causal relationship between official promotion and upstream–downstream disparity and estimated the marginal effect of promotion on residents’ health. The study suggests that local officials limit the pollution emissions of enterprises in the upstream river to achieve environmental performance and relax the pollution restrictions of firms in the downstream river to achieve economic performance, such that the health of residents near the river is differentially affected.