Using the data of listed firms in China’s A-share heavy pollution industry between 2008 and 2020, based on organizational theory, this study examines the impact of prospector-type firms and defender-type firms on environmental information disclosure quality. Empirical evidence shows that prospector-type firms reduce environmental information disclosure quality, compared with defender-type firms. After a series of robustness tests, the conclusion is still valid. This paper tests the impact mechanism of business strategy on environmental information disclosure quality and finds that financing constraints play a mediating effect in the relationship between business strategy and environmental information disclosure quality. This paper enriches and expands the literature in the field of influencing factors of environmental information disclosure quality and economic consequences of business strategy. At the same time, the conclusion of this paper has important reference significance for regulators to formulate policies to improve environmental information disclosure quality according to the heterogeneity of business strategy.

High-quality environmental information disclosure is not only an effective way for the firm to fulfill its environmental responsibility and promote green development, but also an important governance mechanism to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the firm's management and shareholders and alleviate the agency conflict. As an important shareholder of a firm, there are two different hypotheses about the influence of institutional investors on firm decision-making and behavior: monitor and collusion. Institutional investors are not homogeneous, and there are significant differences in the impact of different types of institutional investors on firm decision-making and behavior. We divide institutional investors into the stable institutional investors and the unstable institutional investors, using the data of listed firms in China's A-share heavy pollution industry between 2008 and 2020, and this study explores the effect of institutional investors' heterogeneity on environmental information disclosure behavior from the perspective of environmental information disclosure quality. Empirical evidence shows that institutional investors as a whole have a positively significant impact on environmental information disclosure quality. Further analysis shows that the stable institutional investors have positive impact on environmental information disclosure quality compared with the unstable institutional investors. After a series of robustness tests, the conclusion is still valid. The results of this paper show that institutional investors, especially the stable institutional investors, can effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry, alleviate the agency conflict of the firm, play an active role in corporate governance, strengthen the main responsibility of firm ecological environment protection, and promote the green development of firm. The conclusion of this paper has important reference significance for the regulators to formulate policies to improve environmental information disclosure quality and promote green development according to the heterogeneity of institutional investors.

This study tests the effect of multiple large shareholders on the level of corporate fraud using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018. We find lower probabilities and lower corporate fraud frequencies when there are multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed companies, indicating that their presence plays a supervisory role in internal governance. These results persist after we control for endogeneity. Moreover, the effect of multiple large shareholders on corporate fraud is strengthened with the separation of control right and cash flow right. Further analyses reveal that companies with multiple large shareholders experience considerably reduced information disclosure fraud but no reduction in operating or leader frauds. Additionally, information asymmetry and the capital occupation of controlling shareholders both play a mediating role in the relationship between multiple large shareholders and the level of corporate fraud. This study enriches the literature on the determinants of corporate fraud and the effects of multiple large shareholders. Our findings also provide implications for companies and regulators regarding ways to reduce fraud.

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