We present a novel web page fingerprinting attack that is able to defeat several recently proposed defenses against traffic analysis attacks, including the application-level defenses HTTPOS [15] and randomized pipelining over Tor [18]. Regardless of the defense scheme, our attack was able to guess which of 100 web pages a victim was visiting at least 50% of the time and, with some defenses, over 90% of the time. Our attack is based on a simple model of network behavior and out-performs previously proposed ad hoc attacks. We then build a web site fingerprinting attack that is able to identify whether a victim is visiting a particular web site with over 90% accuracy in our experiments.Our results strongly suggest that ad hoc defenses against traffic analysis are not likely to succeed. Consequently, we describe a defense scheme that provides provable security properties, albeit with potentially higher overheads.

Frames play an important role in signal processing, image processing, data compression and sampling theory. In this paper, symmetric multiwavelet frames with general composite dilation and with any symmetric points are constructed from composite dilation multiwavelet frames given. At last, an example is provided to prove the theory.

The multiwavelet has more desired properties than any single wavelet, such as short support, symmetry, and smoothness. In this paper, symmetric multiwavelet frames with general lattice and with any symmetric points are constructed from multiwavelet frames given. The existing result is generalized to the case of general lattice.

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